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IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

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
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W. ALLEN YOUNG

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Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific

*The influence of missionaries upon European
expansion in the Pacific during the
Nineteenth Century*

*(The Robert Herbert Memorial Prize Essay
1920)*

BY

W. ALLEN YOUNG

UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA

HUMPHREY MILFORD

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A. I. L.

TO
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FOREWORD

THE subject of this essay is so wide that the writer has found himself compelled to limit the field of his inquiry in two directions.

First, this essay will deal only with the British missionaries, but there is justification for this besides the necessity of brevity. For it was the British missionaries whose influence upon European expansion was most marked, since they attempted, and in part succeeded, in directing it along channels consistent with their faith ; while the initiative of the French and of the German missionaries was curbed by their respective states, upon whom they were more dependent for protection and upon whose policy therefore they had less effect.

Secondly, this essay will not attempt to treat intensively the whole field of British missionary work. The writer has confined himself to pointing out certain landmarks in a short general survey, and afterwards to looking at the history of British New Guinea in rather more detail, since it provides the most vivid illustration of his argument.

The following brief summary of that argument may help the reader in following the writer's rapid glances at the history of islands which are dotted in a curious and untidy profusion over an ocean covering about one third of the earth's surface.

I. The history of the Pacific in the nineteenth century

is remarkable for the appearance of a new ideal in the theory of colonization, namely, the protection and the development of the native races as a duty of the expanding race, whose best interest, however, is bound up with the performance of it.

2. The British missionaries were the sponsors of this ideal; and by their own organization and work, and by the direct influence they exerted upon the government at home, and upon those in the colonies, and upon the administrators in the Pacific, they were able to mould policy in conformity with this ideal.

3. They were able to do this more completely in New Guinea than elsewhere, because here their methods were more in harmony with their ideal, and the territory was fortunate in having administrators who realized the value of their assistance, and made full use of it.

British New Guinea received its present official name "Papua" in 1906, but I have retained the name by which the territory was known during the period under review.

I am much indebted to Mr Evans Lewin, the Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute, and to Mr J. Pike, the Assistant-Librarian, for their invaluable help in research.

My gratitude is also due to Mr George Johnson for information upon German policy; to Sir George R. Le Hunte, G.C.M.G., for his commentary upon the more recent history of Missionary work in Papua; to Mr David Chamberlin of the London Missionary Society for kindly revising the proofs; and to Mr J. C. Masterman of Christchurch for his unfailing sympathy and encouragement.

W. A. Y.

PART I

A GENERAL SURVEY

“ The dervishes asked me :—

‘ Whom you think a rare man that you have met in your life ?

‘ A man without a right ideal.’ ”

“ They asked again :—

‘ And whom you think a still rarer man ? ’

‘ A man without a wrong method.’ ”

R. A. VRAN-GAVRAN,
The New Age, April 4, 1918.

TO-DAY there are many who are returning anxiously to a study of Western civilization in the light of its recent failure. The acquisitive instinct, which has been a mainspring in the development of both individuals and of groups, has resulted in a war which has menaced the existence of the civilization the same instinct has helped to produce. The complicated framework of Western society, which has hitherto stood, and grown, by means of a delicate adjustment of human relationships based upon rights, rather than duties, appears to be tottering. Those who notice and deplore the divorce to-day between religion and politics, and between ideals and methods, are looking despairingly to the recent past for a sign of a new political principle, which might be used to repair and gradually to rebuild the civilization of the West.

For such gloomy thoughts, a study of the history of the Pacific during the nineteenth century is a good antidote. The value of a civilization is judged best in its relation to

others; and it is in the impact of the West upon the races of the Pacific during the nineteenth century, that there appears a new ideal in Western political thought. For in spite of grave blots upon this page of history, the leaders in colonizing theory no longer accepted the view that the colonizing race had a right to demand from the savage race submission, and labour, and wealth, but underlined the record upon this page with a new principle, that it was the duty of the colonizing race to serve the interests of the native inhabitants by protecting and educating them. And the very blots emphasized this, for these leaders opened the eyes of Europeans to the recognition that the record was marred, and not decorated, by these blots.

The leaders who did this were the British missionaries. To appreciate rightly the significance of the part they played in European expansion during this century however, it is necessary to glance at the characteristics of that expansion in the previous centuries.

The history of European expansion in the Pacific divides roughly into three periods. The first starts at about the time of the Papal Bull of 1493¹ when, worse than a divorce between religion and politics, religion lost its identity in the ambitions of kings. The second starts in 1577, when Drake sailed forth in defiance of the religious imperialism of Spain, and it is marked by the absence of a religious motive, and by the predominance of the commercial motive. But in 1795 the third period begins with the founding of the London Missionary Society. This Society, and other similar societies, breathed a new life into theories

¹ In a Bull dated May 4th, 1493, Pope Alexander VI. divided the new world between the kings of Portugal and Spain prohibiting any others, "although of Imperial and regal dignity," from trading or travelling "without special licence" of them, "under the pain of the sentence of excommunication."

of colonial statesmanship, and its members preached successfully a forgotten ideal, moulding the policy of an expanding state by the force of their religious convictions.

During the first period, the Church, the State, and the adventurers—the servants of the State—all took a political view of religion. This was the time of the ascendancy of Spain and of Portugal, and of the menace to England of Catholic Imperialism, already straddling across Europe, and now stretching out greedy hands to the New World as well.

For a time those Imperial and Papist hands were active in converting the savage inhabitants of the new lands to Christianity, by sending them to heaven to taste its sweetness. And from their dead bodies and their outraged lands they took gold, and silver, and precious stones for the glory of Catholic altars.

“These discoverers,” writes Mr J. D. Rogers, in an illuminating summary of the period, “were one and all state servants sailing in state ships, cross in one hand and sword in the other, to enter on the government of some kingdom and receive tribute from it.”¹

The friars who went with them—the missionaries of that time—were state servants also, and acted under the orders of the commander of the expedition. Members of a Church still under the Jewish influence upon Christianity, having still the magical conception of God, as a hostile Being who had to be appeased by rites, and by the slaying of His enemies, they did not, however, hesitate to countenance occasionally the sin of Saul, who “destroyed all the people with the edge of the sword” but “spared . . . the best of the sheep and of

¹ *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, 1907. J. D. Rogers. vol. vi. p. 6.

the oxen and of the fatlings, and the lambs, and all that was good.”¹

But though they were the apostles of their Church, they had less influence upon the manner in which Christianity was carried to these heathen lands than the navigators and the soldiers. And they acquiesced in the most sacred symbol of their religion, the symbol of sacrifice and of love, being set up by a conqueror as the sign of his triumph, and as an assertion of the rights claimed by his king in virtue of it.² Also, strangely enough, some years after the Pope had first struggled to retain his supremacy over the temporal head of England, there were priests with Quiros who did not protest when the Blessed Sacrament was preceded in procession by the banner of Spain.³

¹ 1 Samuel xv. 8, 9.

“Among the 1200 warriors sent by King Emmanuel to follow up the discovery of Vasco da Gama were included a band of friars, and the commander of the expedition received the following instructions: ‘Before he attacked the Moors and idolaters of those parts with the material and secular sword, he was to allow the priests and monks to use their spiritual sword, which was to declare to them the Gospel . . . and convert them to the faith of Christ. . . . And should they be so contumacious as not to accept this law of faith . . . and should they forbid commerce and exchange . . . in that case they should put them to fire and sword, and carry on fierce war against them.’” (*The Project of a Commonwealth*, 1915, p. 131, quoting Hunter, *A History of British India*.)

² “Magellan ‘set up at the top of the highest mountain a very large cross as a sign that this country belonged to the King of Spain . . . and gave to the mountain the name of the Mount of Christ,’ made rude chiefs mumble Aves, Paternosters and Credos like parrots, and do homage and swear fealty to the King of Spain.” (Rogers, *loc. cit.*, p. 7.)

³ Quiros, in describing to the King of Spain his occupation of Espiritu Santo, wrote: “First, Sir, we erected a cross and built a church, in honour of Our Lady of Loretto. Then we caused twenty masses to be celebrated there . . . and made a solemn procession and observed the feast of the Blessed Sacrament, the which was carried in procession, your banner being displayed and marching before it, through a great

The subordinate part which the religious motive played in European expansion during this first period is well illustrated in the eighth petition, addressed by Quiros to the King of Spain, begging him to "give command to have a goodly and great city built in this port and bay" in this country,¹ which would prove to be "another China and Japan" in riches, and able "to nourish 200,000 Spaniards."² For the emphasis is laid in this appeal almost entirely upon the commercial possibilities of settlement, and upon the glory and wealth which would come from dominion there. But the predominant thought of the period comes out in a few lines at the close of a long description of the riches of the land. In these, Quiros, although the second period was already overlapping the close of the first, still clings to the thought that religion provided a sanction for the conquest of foreign lands, and for the exploiting of their wealth, and he brings forward, almost shamefacedly, "the principal reason" for settlement—"that this is the sole ordinary way to establish the knowledge of God and faith amongst them" (the savages). Then he naïvely adds, as knowing what alone appealed to his king: "And this ought to be embraced with the more readiness, because it is the channel to convey and disperse all abundance of commodities amongst your subjects. And hereby you shall be eased of many vexations, which will assuredly be put upon you in case the enemies of the Church of Rome should enter, and nestle there, and should vent their erroneous doctrines amongst them, whereby they would . . . arrogate unto themselves the names of the Lords of the Indies."³

circuit of countries which were honoured by the presence of the same." (*Terra Australis Incognita*. J. Callander, 1766, vol. ii. p. 176.)

¹ Espiritu Santo.

² Callander, *loc. cit.*, p. 173.

³ Callander, *loc. cit.*, p. 177.

Thus Quiros reacted to his memories in calling the spread of the Catholic faith "the principal reason" for settlement, and in asserting the old view that religion had a political value. But in mentioning this "principal reason" only as an afterthought, he intuitively recognized that it was no longer a reason for expansion at all, and that men had begun to divorce motives of religion from those of commerce and politics.

While Quiros was thus petitioning in vain, the enemies of Spain had already launched forth upon their piratical raids upon her commerce. Mr Rogers writes: "They wished not to discover but to oppose";¹ but it should be added, they went not to oppose Catholicism, or to claim new converts to Protestantism. As an example of Drake's thirst for silver and gold, this writer instances the Spaniard who was found asleep with bars of silver beside him. They robbed him of the silver and left him. But here, too, is symbolized the attitude of the Protestant navigators towards missionary work, and its contrast with the attitude of the Catholic navigators. Religion in its aspect of the relationship of a chosen race to the heathen made no appeal to them. There is probably not a single recorded instance of an attempt made by them to convert Catholic prisoners to Protestantism, for it mattered not to them whether the souls of the queen's enemies passed to perdition, or to paradise, so long as they speedily left their bodies.

This change of attitude was revolutionary and lasting. For a period religion becomes entirely a personal relationship of the individual with his God, unaffected by, and unaffecting, the relationship of the expanding nations with the backward races, or with each other. Drake is forced into antagonism with Doughty, when the

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 9.

latter plays traitor to their temporal faith, and Doughty is condemned to die. But before Doughty leaves the cabin, Drake and he bear witness to their common religious faith and partake of the Blessed Sacrament together.¹

Thus the missionary friars, who have acted as chorus to the royal players and their attendants, are driven off the stage by pirates, who do not stop to argue with them upon the meaning of their chants.

The pirates are followed by traders, whose only interest is commerce and who come as servants of capitalist companies, their orders drafted in the counting-house instead of the palace. Australia and Tasmania are discovered, and New Zealand sighted, by Dutchmen in search of markets and supplies, and of sites for trading stations. Tasman is instructed to take possession only of uninhabited lands (some of his countrymen had been murdered by savages not long before), and elsewhere to behave well and friendly to the natives—in spite of the fact that they were heathens. Thus religion as a motive for enterprise loses its power in the seventeenth century;—and where Magellan planted a cross, Tasman might have placed a golden calf—but for the fact that a trader could not be extravagant. And so he put up posts and tin plates instead.²

The trading motive gathered power in the eighteenth century, and found an outlet in a new channel. At the close of the previous century English sovereigns reasserted their right to play a leading part, and the state became

¹ Doughty was in command of the sloop *Swan* during the first months of Drake's voyage round the world. He deserted off the coast of South America, was overtaken and executed at Port St Julian. There is evidence that he was in Spanish pay. Froude, *English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century*. 1907, pp. 114–117.

² Rogers, *loc. cit.*, pp. 11, 12.

patron of trade.¹ But the state naturally before long took a broader view of expansion, and thought not only of money bags, but of colonists²—but of these, in no sense as missionaries of civilization to the natives.

The initiative came from France, who now started upon her career of rivalry with England, and the competition between the two powers resulted in the completion of the discovery of the Pacific lands, and in the assertion of national claims by written notices upon the trunks of trees, and by plates.³ But beyond De Brosse's suggestion of planting convict settlements, out of which possibly sprang the colonization of Australia, there were no theories upon how the new lands were to be peopled or administered, and no forethought upon the problem of how this expansion would affect the native inhabitants. At least records of it are hard to find, and both those who passed excitedly from one new island to another, and those who heard of their adventures, probably had no other hopes than those of dominion and wealth.

This is the period of the assertion of rights—of the right of the discoverer to take territory from savages who were not developing it, and of his right to hold it against those with intentions similar to his own, who were unlucky enough to arrive after him.

¹ Cook held a royal commission to advance "the honour of this nation as a maritime power . . . and the trade and navigation thereof." His secret orders were "to take possession in the name of the King of Great Britain of convenient situations in such countries as you may discover that have not already been visited or discovered by any other foreign power." (Rogers, *loc. cit.*, p. 20.)

² De Brosse declared that trade would "create new nations." A state did not lose its rights over its people when it exported them, for the state was the tree and its colonists the branches (quoted by Rogers, *loc. cit.*, p. 18).

³ Rogers, *loc. cit.*, pp. 20, 21.

It is not strange that, in these Southern Seas, Darwin found an atmosphere fitting to his meditations upon the law of struggle. Yet even while he cruised there, accumulating material evidence for the truth of his theory, the atmosphere was changing; and curiously enough, he actually met some of those who were responsible for the change. For he visited Tahiti,¹ where the missionaries had already started to bear witness to a new principle of progress, based upon the inter-relation not of rights, but of duties.

Yet this principle, like many of the islands where its truth was proved, was new only in its re-discovery, and in the manner of its application. For the missionaries were only pioneers of thought in that they were the first to apply to political conduct the principles of personal conduct, to which Europeans in their churches had blindly, like automats, long paid lip-service. Both they, and later the administrators whom they advised and influenced, did sincerely try to carry out the commandment of the Nazarene to love their neighbour as themselves, even though he was of a backward race. And for their reward they obtained the fulfilment of His promise. For it has been the meek who have inherited the Pacific.

At the close of the eighteenth century, therefore, the islands of the Pacific lay open, awaiting the outflow of colonists from Europe. There can be few more astonishing changes in the kaleidoscope of history than this—that those who first came with enthusiasm to the new lands did not come like their predecessors to assert rights of possession, but disinterestedly, to claim their right to serve the native inhabitants.

It is still more astonishing to find that John Williams,

¹ *The Pacific, Its Past and Future.* G. H. Scholefield, 1919, p. 7.

the pioneer missionary, in a flash of intuition, realized, in part, the significance of the change which he and his followers were making. After noticing, with wonder, the extraordinary enthusiasm with which the project of Dr. Haweis had been received, and the ease with which the L.M.S. had collected £10,000 to carry it out, he wrote of Tahiti :—

“Little did its discoverer think when hoisting the broad pennant on the Tahitian shores and taking possession of the island in the name of his sovereign, King George III., that in a few short years the Missionary sent by the liberality and sustained by the prayers of British Christians, would follow in his track . . . unfurl another banner, and take possession of that and other islands in the name of the King of kings.”¹

The new motive behind expansion is made clear by the phrases of Williams. These first settlers in the Pacific Islands came, not as Christian Britishers, but as “British Christians.” The conversion of the native was their sincere purpose, and was not merely a means towards obtaining control of his territory.

The relation of their loyalties was different from that of the navigators and friars and traders, in that loyalty to their faith was the supreme loyalty, but yet supreme only in that it included their national loyalty. So Williams assured his sovereign in dedicating his book to him, declaring that the missionaries “in prosecuting the one great object to which their lives are consecrated, . . . will keep in view whatever may promote the Commerce and the Science, as well as the Religious glory, of their beloved Country.”²

Within the limitations imposed by his supreme loyalty,

¹ *A Narrative of Missionary Enterprise*. Rev. J. Williams, 1837, p. 3.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. v.

Williams is ready to serve his nation, and although he himself did not attach the first importance to the political results of missionary work, he realized that "wherever the missionary goes, new channels are cut for the stream of commerce,"¹ and that shipping would find security in harbours where previously from fear of savage inhabitants it had not entered.²

Indeed, in his general appeal at the end of the volume, he addresses himself to the "statesman," pointing out the political advantages to be gained by national support of missionary work. But it is not political support he requires but unofficial service by the provision of funds and by individual work, and also recognition from the highest in the land that his cause is good, and that the profession of missionary is as noble as that of statesman or soldier, and worthy of the sons of the nobility.

But it is clear that the background of his thought was that the political advantages to be gained by the nation were not to be found by seeking them, but only by serving the Ideal through the missionary organization established to preach it. And he wished his countrymen to share with him his enthusiastic belief that these political advantages were unimportant compared to the glory which was to be won, by prosecuting with the missionaries "the one great object to which their lives were consecrated"—the conversion and civilization of the heathen.

Williams is thus the first of the new patriots—those who point their nation to the glory to be achieved by giving instead of by acquiring. His national loyalty did

¹ *E.g.* Williams introduced the Cavendish banana into the Pacific Islands by obtaining some plants from the Duke of Devonshire, one of which survived the journey out there and was planted in Samoa (*The New Pacific*, C. B. Fletcher, 1917, pp. 76, 77). Marsden introduced wheat into New Zealand.

² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 582-584.

not take the form of a desire to see the British flag triumphant in the Pacific, but rather to see its islands filled with British servants, who should be the noblest his country could produce.

His views and those of his followers were not anti-Imperialist, as critics have declared, but rather the vision of a new Imperialism, and he saw the conversion of Tahiti as a centre for missionary expansion, "from whence the streams of salvation are to flow to . . . the Fiji, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Solomon's Archipelago, New Britain, New Ireland, and above all the immense island of New Guinea." ¹

Of this idealism the missionary kingdoms of Tahiti and Tonga were the natural results. For in the early part of the century the only people to be governed in the islands were the natives, to whom the missionaries came as spiritual teachers, but of whom they were forced to become the social and political advisers as well.

There seems no reason to disbelieve Williams when he denied that the missionary desired to establish theocracies. "I would not, however, be supposed to advocate the assumption of political authority by the missionary," he wrote, "but on the contrary, that he should interfere as little as possible; and whether it be in civil, legal, or political affairs, that he should do so solely by his advice and influence. There are circumstances, however, especially in newly-formed missions, where he must step out of his ordinary course and appear more prominent than he would wish." ²

These so-called missionary kingdoms were unsuited, however, to the control of white settlers and traders, and when the latter began to visit the islands, missionary policy underwent a change. After acting as a stimulus

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 6, 7.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 140.

to expansion, the missionaries, disillusioned by the form that expansion took, felt obliged to oppose it.

This process of disillusionment is well seen in the early history of New Zealand. The Gospel came to this country owing to the faith of Samuel Marsden in its future, and his energy in fitting out an expedition there, in spite of the opposition of the Government. For as in New Guinea later, only disinterested motives at first were strong enough to move men to risk the dangers from savages, and since the Governor of New South Wales refused permission unless a vessel could be chartered, and since no captain could be found to venture for less than £600, Marsden bought a ship with his own money and sailed for the islands with a party of thirty-five, on November 19, 1814.¹

The missionary enthusiasm of Marsden, who had more of the colonist's spirit than Williams, had been awakened by occasional meetings with Maoris on the quay at Port Jackson, and more especially by the interest and sympathy aroused by a chief, Duaterra, whom he had befriended, on finding him a victim of unscrupulous white traders.² Thus Marsden's views show a development from those of Williams. Where Williams wished to replace the national flag by an imaginary banner of a spiritual King, Marsden welcomed the hoisting of the national flag at the first Christian service held in New Zealand, considering it "as the signal and the dawn of civilization, liberty and religion in that dark and benighted land." "I never viewed the British colours with more gratification," he wrote, "and flattered myself they would never be removed till the natives of that island enjoyed all the happiness of British subjects."³ And

¹ *Life and Work of Samuel Marsden*. J. B. Marsden, 1858, pp. 90-95.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 64-68, and 92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

almost at once he endeavoured to explain to the natives British customs and institutions, such as trial by jury, pointing out to them the evils of theft and lying and cannibalism.¹

Marsden was thus in agreement with Williams in regarding the responsibilities involved in national expansion, rather than the profits to be obtained from it. He differed from Williams in believing that it was through their political organization as much as through their missionary societies that those duties could be performed by "British Christians."

For a time he continued to take an optimistic view of British expansion, and after one of his occasional visits to New Zealand in 1821, he wrote hopefully of the spread of the Gospel and of the blessings of civilization in the South Seas, adding in emphasis of the religious view of politics which he held, that "to impart these blessings to the New Zealander is an object worthy of the British nation ; a more noble undertaking could not be suggested to the Christian world."²

Unfortunately demoralization crept in through white traders, whose actions could not be controlled, and even owing to missionaries who proved unworthy of their trust, so that on his last visit in 1837, he was distressed to see the unhappy state of the Bay of Islands "where drunkenness, adultery and murder are committed," and remarked that "some civilized Government must take New Zealand under its protection or the most dreadful evils will be committed by runaway convicts, sailors and publicans." "When I return to New South Wales," he added, "I purpose to lay the state of New Zealand before the Colonial Government."³

The writer has been unable to find any record of the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

² *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³ Marsden, *loc. cit.*, p. 258.

action Marsden took, but there is circumstantial evidence which suggests that missionary influence had something to do with the refusal of Lord Glenelg to sanction the granting of a charter to the New Zealand Company, and with the appointment of Captain Hobson as British Consul with orders to negotiate a treaty with the Maori tribes. For Lord Glenelg in informing Lord Durham of his decision¹ drew attention to the report of Captain Hobson,² who had visited the Bay of Islands and had been impressed by the power of the missionaries, and who described the evils noticed by Marsden in much the same words as the missionary used, and proposed the same preventive and cure for them. And Wakefield in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1840 complained bitterly of the fact that Lord Glenelg, James Stephen, and Sir George Grey were all officers of the Church Missionary Society, and that the Secretary of the latter was apparently consulted on several occasions by the Colonial Office.³ Many of the missionaries on the spot, however, were not supporters of the policy of Government intervention. In 1833 James Busby had been appointed British resident in New Zealand, and Goderich wrote to the chiefs that Busby would endeavour to protect them from the violence and crime of white adventurers of bad character.⁴

But although Busby was "specially accredited to the

¹ February 5, 1838. PP. 1840, No. 582, p. 153.

² PP. 1838, No. 122.

³ PP. 1840, No. 582, pp. 4, 7, 8, 148.

Although Under-Secretary, Stephen had great influence, his colleague, Sir H. Taylor, declaring that "for many years he literally ruled the Colonial Empire" (*Dict. of Nat. Biography*). He was a son-in-law of John Venn, one of the founders of the Church Missionary Society.

⁴ *The Pacific, Its Past and Future*. G. H. Scholefield, 1919, pp. 204, 205.

missionaries and directed to consult with them " ; owing to a difference of opinion upon minor points of policy he found himself opposed by them at a critical moment. Without sufficient powers his position rapidly became ludicrous and useless, and he decided to invite both the Wesleyan and the Church Missionary Society missionaries to a conference "to consult whether it might not be prudent for them to induce the chief . . . to petition His Majesty for assistance in reducing their country to order, and establishing in it an efficient Government." But the Wesleyans excused themselves with an apology, and the members of the Church Missionary Society neglected to attend without a word of explanation.¹

In spite of this incident Busby, in requesting Governor Sir R. Bourke to ask the British Government to undertake the protection of New Zealand, declared that although he could no longer co-operate with the missionaries, he was in accord with their opinions in general and respected their zeal, and advocated "a defined and specific share in the government of the country" being allotted to the missionaries, as otherwise "that influential body, in the character which they have assumed to themselves of guardians to the natives," might "conceive it their duty to use their influence in opposition."²

The evidence of Busby therefore shows that the missionaries resident in New Zealand took a narrower view than Marsden—partly no doubt because, unlike Marsden, they had not had an opportunity of appreciating the colonist's standpoint from personal experience—and that, as Scholefield suggests, they were "hostile to the introduction of British sovereignty, for the very human

¹ PP. 122 of 1838.

² June 16, 1837. Forwarded to Lord Glenelg, September 9, 1837. PP. 122 of 1838, pp. 10, 11.

reason that it would tend to detract from the position of influence, almost of power, which they themselves held with the natives." ¹

However, as had occurred before in the case of Australia and afterwards in the case of New Guinea, it was the action of a foreign power which settled the question of sovereignty. Fear of French enterprise induced Busby to call an assembly of chiefs, which declared the Independence of the United Tribes of New Zealand, receiving the recognition of William IV. Fear of French enterprise four years later forced the Government to send out Captain Hobson to obtain by treaty from the native inhabitants the cession of their sovereignty to Great Britain.²

Upon the landing of Captain Hobson, missionary policy passed into its final phase. Stimulus to expansion had resulted in the immigration of bad characters, opposition had failed to check the flow, and native government under missionary influence had lamentably failed. In 1839 the New Zealand Company "in direct defiance of the authority of the Crown" ³ broke through the checks placed upon private enterprise by missionary influence at the Colonial Office, and by shipping one thousand settlers to New Zealand made a bad position much worse. The intervention of the Government for strategic reasons gave the final blow to missionary hopes of establishing an independent Maori state under a government advised by British missionaries.⁴ From henceforth all the missionaries could do was to act as interpreters—in the widest sense—to the Government, and to provide an influence upon it which should ensure that the natives

¹ Scholefield, *loc. cit.*, p. 205.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 205-207.

³ Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, 1844. PP. 556, p. xvi.

⁴ *Life of Marsden*, pp. 255, 256.

were not treated with injustice, either by intent or owing to negligence or ignorance.

This gradual development of missionary policy under the force of circumstances was acknowledged by Dandeson Coates, the Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in his examination by the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1840. In answer to the allegation of Wakefield that, at a stormy interview with three members of the New Zealand Association, he had threatened the latter with opposition and had carried out that threat, Coates declared that it had been the wish of the Society that a native government should be established in New Zealand with the help of the Government. His Society had no wish to discourage colonization, but had been opposed to the assumption of sovereignty by Great Britain, believing it to be "a violation of the fundamental principles of international law," but in view of the growth of the existing evils they "felt perfectly satisfied" with the general instructions under which Captain Hobson was proceeding, "and they have remained perfectly quiescent with regard to all subsequent proceedings."¹

Those instructions included the information that to overcome the difficulties he would have to face from ignorant and distrustful natives, Captain Hobson would "find powerful auxiliaries amongst the missionaries, who have won and deserved their confidence"; and he was told "to afford the utmost encouragement, protection and support to their Christian teachers," and to give them "pecuniary aid."²

¹ PP. Report, New Zealand, 1840, 582, pp. 80-83.

² Earl of Normanby to Capt. Hobson, August 14, 1839, quoted in *A.P.S.*, pp. 60, 61.

Compare Para. 10 of instructions to Sir Peter Scratchley, November 17, 1884, PP. 1885, c. 4273, p. 30 . . . "you will doubtless receive willing and efficient aid from the missionaries who have settled in New Guinea and established a friendly intercourse with the natives."

The missionaries on the whole did not prove unworthy of the hopes of the Government, and the claim of the Aborigines Protection Society is well-founded. The Committee of this Society in 1846 pointed out to the "late Secretaries of State for the British Colonies," that when the colonization of New Zealand was determined upon, "fruitless opposition was not vexatiously continued," and it was probable that "the influence acquired by the missionaries indirectly, if not directly, facilitated the arrangements regarding the acquisition of land, as it unquestionably did the transactions of the Government, first for declaring the independence and subsequently for effecting the annexation of the country." ¹

In one important instance, however, this was not the case. Fortunately the Government at home met with opposition from a missionary bishop, when it proposed to Governor Grey that New Zealand should be provided with a constitution which would have shut out the natives from all voice in the Government, and must have placed the latter largely in the hands of the New Zealand Company. Sir George Grey's biographer emphasizes the firm friendship which existed between him and Bishop G. A. Selwyn, and the influence the bishop exerted upon the statesman.² When the constitution passed by the British Parliament in 1846 was referred to the Governor, Selwyn wrote to him (and to Earl Grey) "vigorous and outspoken denunciations" of it, and Sir George Grey, who refused to accept it, received from his friend "warm sympathy and vigorous aid," in bravely and successfully maintaining his opposition.

The farewell address of the Maori to Sir George Grey,

¹ *On the British Colonization of New Zealand*, 1846, pp. 11, 12.

² *Life and Times of Sir George Grey*. W. L. Rees, 1892, vol. i. pp. 118-146.

in 1854, probably gives a true picture of the co-operation which existed between these two, and suggests the value of this, and also of the early missionary work to the native population of New Zealand :

“ When the missionaries came first to this land,” declared the Maori orator, “ there was little industry, and little good was visible . . . and all lived in ignorance. Then God kindled His light, and lo ! it became as day.

“ After this came Governor Hobson, and then a little fear came over us. After him came Governor Fitzroy, and things went on in a similar way. But when you came, oh Governor Grey, it was like the shock of an earthquake ; your fame rose to the centre of the island, and extended to the waves on the ocean’s shore. You came with two lights, and these are they : The lamp of God, and the lamp of the world.

“ Your efforts on behalf of God’s cause are the establishment of schools, the erection of houses of prayer—thus following in the footsteps of the Church. These are the things you did in regard to the body ; encouraged industry in the cultivation of the soil, pointed out the means of acquiring property, and raised this island to its present state of prosperity. . . . You have been as one of the ministers of the churches,¹ therefore we call you by these names : The Peacemaker, the Honourable, the Friendly One, the Loving One, the Kind One, the Director, the Protector . . . and the Father.

“ Although we heard of your projected departure, we thought, nevertheless, that you would stay. Both you and Bishop Selwyn are going. New Zealand will thus be left without a parent.” ²

The language of savages like that of children sometimes

¹ It is difficult to say whether the compliment was the greater to the missionary or to the statesman.

² W. L. Rees, *loc. cit.*, p. 184.

has an aptness unapproachable by the phrases of a maturer vocabulary. To be a parent, and not a taskmaster to the subject race—here surely is the ideal of the British Pro-Consul. And is not this also the true imperialism—to bring and not to take? To bring two lights: The lamp of God and the lamp of the world? ¹

Forty years only had passed since Marsden first landed in New Zealand. When he first planted the seed of the new Imperialism, he could hardly have hoped that, in so short a time, young and vigorous shoots would appear.

Missionary policy went through much the same development throughout the Pacific as in New Zealand, and it is best to turn to Fiji for a good example of what the advice of even a single missionary could effect in moulding Government policy to conform to principles of justice towards the native races in the settlement of land claims.

There is no more difficult problem of colonial statesmanship than to regulate the sale of land by the native inhabitants to those who, by reason of their superior civilization, claim the right to buy hundreds of acres of it for a few firearms and a keg or two of liquor. While the settlers with some justice may complain that much of the land is undeveloped, and for that reason "the natives can have but a qualified dominion over it, or a right of occupancy only"; ² others who are anxious that justice shall be done to the natives, assert that "if these

¹ It is worth noticing that from a suggestion by W. Lawry, the General Superintendent of National Missions in 1847, and from the experience of Grey and Selwyn in their voyage together through the Pacific Archipelagos, sprang the Federation scheme, rejected by Earl Grey, to form a self-governing and self-supporting Empire in the Pacific, moulded by Christianity and European civilization. (Rees, W. L., *loc. cit.*, pp. 128, 129, and Scholefield, *loc. cit.*, 1919, pp. 278-280.)

² Sir G. Gipps, quoted in PP. 1844, No. 556, p. iii.

can procure the means of bettering their condition " there is no level to which they may not rise,¹ and that their proprietary rights ought to be considered.

Although the British Colonial Office throughout the nineteenth century was unwilling to annex fresh territory on account of the responsibility which, in the view of the missionaries, the more civilized nation owed to the backward race, replying that " the hope of a conversion of a people to Christianity, however specious, must not be made a reason for increasing the British dominions,"² yet when annexation was forced upon it by the strategic situation in the Pacific, it held nobly to the policy initiated by missionary influence in the 'thirties, and endeavoured to administer the new territory in conformity with justice to the native.

In this the missionaries were of great assistance, since they were conversant with the native language and customs, and, being disinterested, were thus qualified both by their knowledge and their character to give an authoritative opinion upon the nature of native law.

This was particularly so in the case of Fiji. Previous to the cession in October 1874, many thousands of acres had been " sold " to white men of various antecedents, and one of the earliest actions of the Government after the sovereignty of the island had been assumed was to appoint a commission to inquire into Land Titles. Sir John Thurston held the view that the lands of Fiji were vested in the ruling chiefs, and that the remainder occupied it upon a basis of feudal tenure which could be terminated at will by the ruling chiefs.³ Sir H. Robinson supported him, holding that the land title, as well as the

¹ Marsden, *loc. cit.*, p. 138.

² PP. 1862, No. 2995 (quoted by Scholefield, *loc. cit.*, p. 79).

³ Quoted by Rev. L. Fison. *Land Tenure in Fiji* (first published at Suva in 1903), p. 28.

sovereignty of the group, had been transferred to Her Majesty by the chiefs.¹

In fact the system of land tenure in Fiji was much more complicated. The discovery of this was due to the work of a missionary, Lorimer Fison, who delivered a lecture upon it at Levuka, when the Lands Commission was about to sit. He proved conclusively that by custom, *i.e.* by law, the land was held in common by Mataqali,² that it was entailed to posterity, that it could be occupied by force, but could never be possessed by any Mataqali other than the one owning it, and that chiefs had no right to dispose of it, although by an act of despotism they might do so illegally. Fison concluded his lecture by declaring that "in ceding the Fiji Islands to the British Crown the chiefs most certainly understood that they were making over the lands as well as the sovereignty of the Group. . . . But it is equally certain that they had not the land title in their hands. In all righteousness, therefore, it is the management, not the ownership, of the Fijian estate that has come into the possession of the Crown."³

This lecture had a profound effect upon British policy with regard to the land question not only in Fiji but also later in New Guinea.⁴ The Hon. V. A. Williamson, Chairman of the Lands Commission, wrote to the Colonial Office that it was only gradually that the Commissioners who were at first "profoundly ignorant" of native customs came to understand the native point of view. "I believe I am quite correct," he declared, "in expressing my conviction that the lecture of the Rev. L. Fison (forwarded

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

² A part of a village community—literally, "a band of men twisted together," of which "the twist is a common descent." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ Fletcher, *The New Pacific*, p. 173.

herewith) . . . operated quite as a revelation to the European population.”¹

The lecture was quoted by the Lands Commission in their final report of February 2, 1882, as an authority upon the ancient Fijian customs as to land tenure (par. 37), and upon the rights and power of chiefs to override that custom (par. 44). In the controversy with the German Foreign Office upon the legality of the decision of the Commission, it appears to have been the deciding factor. It was enclosed *in toto* to the German Ambassador (October 24, 1882), together with the letter of Williamson, who based his contradiction of the claims of Messrs Hennings upon it. The full history of the controversy, and the effect upon it of the lecture, is given in *The New Pacific*, by Mr Fletcher, who declares that, as a result of the study of its conclusions, “any claims possible to the Crown upon lands not in use by the natives were allowed to lapse.”

It is possible to argue that recognition of the native rights in land has complicated the labour question, placed unnecessary obstacles in the way of the settlement and development of the Group, and tended to demoralize the natives. But that is a debatable question outside the scope of this essay, which is only intended to trace the influence that missionaries like Fison have had in securing the acceptance by British administration of the principle that the interests of British colonists shall only be pursued, in so far as they do not impinge upon the rights and interests of the natives.

This was how the natives' rights in land were dealt with when there were missionaries ready to give advice, and administrators wise enough to take it. “As far as Germany was concerned, however, the lecture remained

¹ PP. 1883, c. 3584, p. 66.

a dead document, and German claims upon native lands, rejected in Fiji, were uniformly allowed at all the vital points of German expansion in the Pacific.”¹

The transactions upon which those claims were based are referred to in the report by Sterndale of 1874.² The property of Godeffroy at Apia, for instance, “comprising about 25,000 acres of purchased land, of which the greater proportion is not to be surpassed in fertility in any region of the tropical world,” was “bought at a low rate . . . and paid for chiefly in ammunition and arms.”

Such were the claims allowed when Germans used their “best influence to obstruct and exclude” the missionaries.³

It was not merely that the Germans, and the British too, when they were uncontrolled by the missionaries or administrators, swindled the natives, but that they provided them with the means of demoralization. Sterndale relates—it is difficult to judge whether with pride or with his tongue in his cheek—that “during the progress of the civil strife which has prevailed for several years back upon the middle island of Samoa, the Messrs Godeffroy enjoyed exceptional advantages in dealing with the natives from the fact of their possessing a manufactory of arms at Liege, in Belgium, whereby they were enabled to supply the belligerents at a very cheap rate with the material of war.” And Messrs Godeffroy and Son, he declares elsewhere, “deservedly rank among the most enlightened merchants of Europe.”⁴

¹ Fletcher, *loc. cit.*, p. 178.

² *Papers relating to the South Sea Islands. New Zealand Blue Book, 1874.* (A copy is in the Library of the Royal Colonial Institute.) It is constantly referred to by Mr Fletcher in *The New Pacific* and in *Stevenson's Germany*.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

Against such commercialism carried on by such "enlightened merchants," the British missionaries from the first determinedly set their face. If George IV. and his entourage had shown as much perception as Marsden they would not have given presents of muskets¹ to Shugie when that chief visited England in 1819; for the latter, upon his return, quite naturally proceeded to massacre his enemies who had none. As a result the natives demanded muskets as the only medium of barter, and the settlers, among whom were two missionaries whose dismissal Marsden afterwards procured, were willing to supply them.²

Marsden, upon his first landing, had prohibited the sale or barter of fire-arms or ammunition on any pretext. "I told them," he wrote, "that the smith should make axes or hoes or any other tools they wanted, but that he was on no account to repair any pistols or muskets . . . no, not even for the greatest chiefs upon the island."³ In 1820, therefore, he was much disturbed at the situation created by the folly of his sovereign, and urged the settlers on no account to supply arms, and wrote to the Church Missionary Society in London that it would be "better to give up the mission for the present than to trade in those articles."⁴

Those who followed Marsden took up the same attitude, and Blue Books contain records of the support the missionaries afforded to the Government, in its endeavours to stamp out the traffic.

Equally demoralizing to the natives was the liquor trade, and the history of this also contains evidence of the restraining influence of the missionaries, who always

¹ And other presents, which were exchanged for muskets at Port Jackson.

² Marsden, *loc. cit.*, pp. 147, 170, 171.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

opposed wholeheartedly anything which involved the exploiting of the ignorance of savages for an immediate commercial advantage.

The nation which "obstructed" and "excluded" them held different views. In 1876 the British and American Consuls in Samoa "applied to the German Consul, Mr Pöppe, to join them in forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquors to the natives, it being reasonably feared that, under the influence of drink, fresh outrages would take place. But this Mr Pöppe declined to do, for 'reasons of his own,' which he declined to give. Messrs Godeffroy practically monopolize the imported liquor trade in Samoa." This was the manner in which German officials supported "the most enlightened merchants of Europe" in maintaining their hold over the islands in which they traded.¹

The Sterndale report contains a description of the prosperity and good order existing in Rarotonga which may serve as an instance of the opposite policy to the German, carried out by one of the greatest of the British missionaries, James Chalmers. On taking up his duties there in 1867 Chalmers was faced immediately with the problem of diminishing what he termed "the curse of all curses." The account of the means he took to put a stop to it, in which he was eventually successful, is too long to quote, but is well worth reading.² By his personal influence he induced the chiefs to keep the restrictive law—hitherto a dead letter—really in force, he turned a native volunteer corps to good account, and he persevered in hut-to-hut visiting until the natives took a pride in them and started

¹ Disturbances had occurred over the attempt of a Colonel Steinberger to seize control over the island. (*Coral Islands*, H. Stonehewer Cooper, 1880, vol. ii. p. 46.)

² James Chalmers's *Autobiography and Letters*, ed. by R. Lovett, 1902.

to spend their wealth upon materials and tools. Since his efforts were based upon the principle that if the natives "spend their money upon their homes and dress they will have less to spend upon strong drink," economic law aided him. The new demands called out from Auckland the more respectable type of trader who could satisfy them; and the "miserable traders from Tahiti . . . who would sell their own souls to make a few dollars" were gradually replaced by "traders of a very different stamp from Auckland . . . who brought Manchester and Sheffield goods, excellent in quality and abundant in quantity, as well as provisions and what other things the natives may like." "These find it their interest," Chalmers added, "to oppose the liquor traffic."¹

But the evils of the arms and liquor traffic were petty compared with the gross crimes of the labour trade. And the value of the services of the missionaries in fighting it, and in mitigating its bad influence upon the relations between the civilized and the savage races was correspondingly greater. Here alone there is sufficient matter for an interesting book, but the writer who later deals shortly with the part the missionaries of New Guinea played can only now find space to refer to two Blue Books in support of his general argument.

In the report of a Commission of 1884 to inquire into the working of the Western Pacific Orders in Council, much of the evidence of abuses is taken from a statement by Rev. H. A. Robertson, a missionary at Erromanga from 1872-1883. The Commissioners paid a strong tribute to the missionaries, "who form a power ever available to assist in upholding order, too often at the imminent risk of their lives," and they cited the cases of Bishop Selwyn and the Rev. J. Bice, who had helped to arrest

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

native murderers, and also the case of Chalmers, who had acted as a guide to a punitive expedition. The missionaries . . . "placed as they are all over the Pacific," would prove valuable aids to the Deputy-Commissioners, and the Commission advocated co-operation between them, for the mission stations were a "powerful deterrent to crime."¹

Although in this way they assisted the Government officers to arrest murderers and maintain order, the missionaries were careful constantly to point out that native violence was nearly always a reprisal for the excesses committed by the labour ships. In the correspondence which passed between the administrators in the Pacific and the Colonial Office from 1877-1883, the missionaries are often cited as witnesses of the fact.² In many cases articles written by them to colonial papers are the form their evidence takes, proving that they not only influenced the Government against the traffic, but more important, perhaps, colonial public opinion as well.³

Thus the missionaries during the final phase of their policy influenced Government policy in the direction of the aim with which they had originally entered the Pacific, and by their energetic efforts to solve the land question justly, and to put a stop to the labour trade and the arms and liquor traffic, "they and the powerful religious bodies at home which support them, did much to establish the principle that it was the duty of the Government to protect the rights of native races."⁴

There is an odd paradox, though, to notice in the history

¹ PP. 1884, c. 3905, pp. 27, 32.

² E.g., PP. 1883, c. 3641, p. 140.

³ But the allegations of the missionaries were sometimes exaggerated: e.g. Rev. J. G. Paton in *Melbourne Argus*, December 5, 1881. See PP. 1883, c. 3641, p. 136.

⁴ *The Character of the British Empire*. Ramsay Muir, 1917, p. 29.

of this final phase; for when, owing to the action of unscrupulous traders, the missionaries were forced into acting as a check upon expansion, they eventually found that the only method of doing this was to act as a stimulus to it. In order to control the unofficial movement of expansion they were driven to urge an unwilling Government to give its official sanction to it, and hence to assume responsibility for it. The policy of the C.M.S. in regard to official expansion in New Zealand had proved ineffective, and on the whole the later policy throughout the Pacific was to demand "that the British Government ought to assume control in order to keep the traders in order."¹

This was more especially the case towards the close of the century. In the agitation for the annexation of New Guinea and the New Hebrides and the adjacent islands, the missionaries were the leaders of Australian opinion.

Dr George Brown,² under the name "Carpe Diem," wrote a series of articles for the *Sydney Morning Herald* advocating an annexation policy in the Pacific which attracted much attention,³ but the two missionaries who urged it most energetically upon the colonists and the colonial Governments were J. G. Paton and D. MacDonald. From July 16 to October 29, 1883, inclusive, thirty public meetings were held in Victoria demanding annexation of the New Hebrides.⁴ Paton lectured at eleven of them,

¹ *The Character of the British Empire*. Ramsay Muir, 1917, p. 29.

² As the influence of this missionary was chiefly upon German expansion, for his field of work lay mainly in New Britain and New Ireland, he is hardly mentioned in this essay. He did, however, ably assist Sir John Thurston in removing the tyrannical Baker from Tonga in 1889, and in restoring a just order there. He is cited by Fletcher as an important witness against Germany. (*Autobiography*, 1908, pp. 418-461), (Fletcher *loc. cit.*).

³ *The New Pacific*, *loc. cit.*, p. 23-31 and e.g. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, June 9, 1883.

⁴ PP. 1884, c. 3863, p. 88.

and at nine of them the resolutions were either proposed or seconded by a Presbyterian minister. Copies of these resolutions were then forwarded to Lord Derby by the Governor.

The organization of these meetings was in order to show Lord Normanby and Lord Derby that the demands advanced by the missionaries through the Premier, J. Service, were not those of a few individuals who were directly connected with the affairs of the islands, but were sanctioned by a large body of opinion in the colony.

In a letter forwarded to Lord Derby on June 27, 1883, Service enclosed four documents for which he asked "the gravest consideration."¹ The first was a letter from the Rev. D. MacDonald, giving some cogent reasons for annexation. This New Hebrides missionary pointed out that the strategic argument applied equally well to these islands as to New Guinea which had been annexed, and that the majority of the traders and planters there were British. But he laid most emphasis on two facts: first, that the labour outrages there had been worse than in New Guinea, and that therefore to the "helpless" inhabitants was owed a "national debt of reparation," and secondly, that the four missions in Polynesia were all British, the Presbyterian in the New Hebrides being the oldest and largest, and costing in British and colonial money about £6000 per annum.

The second document was a report of the argument advanced by a large deputation, which included several missionaries—five of whom spoke. Stress here too was laid upon the British money spent and British blood spilt, only apparently in order that another nation might step in and reap the harvest.

The third was an imperfect return of the petitions

¹ PP. 1883, c. 3814, p. 23.

that had been presented for the annexation of the New Hebrides between 1862 and 1882, inclusive. Two were by natives through missionaries, one by the New Hebridean mission, three by colonial churches, and one by representatives of all these assembled in a conference at Sydney in 1882.

And finally there was a memorandum by Paton giving some reasons for the annexation of the New Hebrides. He urged that the natives wished it, that twenty-one members of the mission, including Bishop Patteson, had died or been killed in civilizing the group, that over £140,000 of British money had been spent in missionary work, that owing to the work of the mission the islands were now comparatively safe, and that there was no other way to suppress the labour traffic.

In forwarding these documents Service summarized the political reasons ; and added, " As is well pointed out by the missionaries, there are considerations of humanity and civilization which seem to add a clenching force to every other consideration." ¹

The following month, Service wrote again to Lord Normanby regretting the decision of the British Government with regard to New Guinea, and repeating the arguments previously put forward for the annexation of the New Hebrides and the adjacent islands. In citing the documents which he had previously enclosed, and also a report of a meeting held in Melbourne Town Hall on July 16, at which three missionaries seconded the three resolutions in favour of this policy, Service drew attention to " the personnel of the movers in this matter."

" The political advantages of the annexation had long been apparent to me and to other public men in these Colonies," he wrote, " but it was a letter from the Rev.

¹ PP. 1883, c. 3814, p. 23.

D. MacDonald, a well-known New Hebrides missionary, followed by a large deputation of missionaries, clergymen and other prominent philanthropic gentlemen, which formed the means of bringing to a focus the existing feeling on the subject.”¹

The British Government, however, refused to take the step demanded of them, and the controversy dragged on until 1906, when a Convention was signed by France and Great Britain providing that the New Hebrides with the Banks and Torres Islands should form a “region of joint influence.” Elaborate provision was made under Article VIII to control the labour traffic and to settle land disputes, and the traffic in liquor and arms was prohibited.²

Although the missionaries did not obtain a British protectorate for these islands they were at least successful in obtaining for Great Britain a half-measure of control. It is true that the system of joint control has not proved efficient, and that the education of the native has been neglected, so that he lives in idleness and the plantations are undeveloped. But it is not improbable that he would have been in worse case if French designs there had not been opposed at all.³

Apart from the possibility of the group becoming a penal settlement, early in 1883 there was an attempt made by a French colonization company, with capital alleged by Paton to be £22,000, to colonize the New Hebrides with Frenchmen, and thus to force their Government's hands. It was shown by the missionaries that they had bought much land on one of the islands, Efate,⁴ of which the missionaries claimed to have the title-

¹ Forwarded to Lord Derby, July 27, 1883, PP. 1884, c. 3863, p. 11.

² *The Pacific, Its Past and Future*. Scholefield, 1919, pp. 256-272.

³ See *post*, Conclusion, pp. 126, 127.

⁴ In the New Hebrides.

deeds. Paton and another missionary informed the Colonial Office, whose inquiries substantiated their statement.¹ A protest was made to the French Government, and the incident was closed by the consideration received by the natives for the land being returned to the buyers.² This incident provided later a good argument in the case for annexation.

Thus there seems no reason to dispute the statement of Sir William Macgregor that "it was chiefly due to the Presbyterian mission in that group, and to the Victorian Government, that Great Britain was not edged out of these islands."³ As to the part the statesmen played in it, Sir Charles Dilke held the view, which is borne out by the evidence of the Blue Book, that "the agitations for saving the New Hebrides from France and for obtaining New Guinea for ourselves . . . took their shape" from the Premier of Victoria.⁴ But Service himself thought that "it was a letter from . . . a well-known New Hebrides missionary followed by a large deputation of missionaries . . . which formed the means of bringing to a focus the existing feeling on the subject."⁵

It would not be right, however, to argue from the missionary demands for the annexation of more territory to the British Crown, that they were consciously striving to smooth the way for British colonists throughout the nineteenth century. If this short survey, briefly illustrated, is a true sketch of the influence of the missionaries during this period, it proves that although their policy developed until they were eager for the British Govern-

¹ March 1, 1883.

² October 29, 1883. PP. 1884, c. 3863.

³ *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, May 1918.

⁴ *Problems of Greater Britain*, 1890, vol. i. p. 221.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 40.

ment to assume control of the Pacific, their energy sprang from their faith in a new principle—that duties which demanded performance, and not rights which might be claimed, were the only justification for European expansion at all.

At first they acted as a stimulus upon that expansion, constantly crying out for fresh workers in the missionary field. But as the native gradually cast off his savagery under their civilizing influence, the islands became safer and traders and adventurers began to frequent them. Thus, inadvertently, the missionaries encouraged an expansion which was a menace to their plans.

They had hoped to train up the native races until they grew to Christian nations. But the methods, which proved adequate to produce and maintain order, when there were only natives to control, broke down when it became necessary to govern the “civilized” white man.

For a time missionaries still clung to the ideal of Williams, who saw sufficient glory for his nation in disinterested work on behalf of the natives, without any political dominion over them, energetically opposing those whose expansion was a menace to this, and endeavouring, successfully on some occasions, to influence the British Government to do the same.

But this policy also failed, and they were finally driven by the force of circumstances to demand that “the British Government ought to assume control in order to keep the traders in order.” The British Government, however, was unwilling to do this, and one by one the islands of which the cession was declined, passed into the hands of other nations. In others, strategic arguments led the Colonial Office reluctantly, and after much delay, to accept responsibilities which the missionaries and the natives were eager to thrust upon it. Only in

the case of Fiji did it annex in order to control the relations of whites and natives.

But wherever the British flag was hoisted the missionaries worked indefatigably to mould the policy of the administration in accordance with their principle, and to encourage it to perform those duties which they had first taken upon themselves, but which circumstances had taken from them.

But the delay which occurred before this transference of responsibility took place, and the fact that in many cases it never took place at all, was due partly to a failure in the missionaries to realize the moment when their methods were no longer applicable to their ideal. The evils of no-government and of misgovernment were the result.

But in the Southern portion of New Guinea—partly, here also, owing to strategic considerations—the transference took place before much harm was done. And when Southern New Guinea became a British Dependency it was blessed by the co-operation in its service of an administrator who was a missionary, and a missionary who was an administrator. It is, for these two reasons, chosen for more intensive treatment, as an illustration of the gradual development of missionary policy, to mould changing circumstances in conformity with a fixed principle.

PART II

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

“ They asked again :—

‘ And whom you think the rarest man of all ? ’

‘ A man whose ideal and method are neither opposed to nor separated from each other.’ ”

R. A. VRAN-GAVRAN,
(*Loc. cit.*).

CHAPTER I

EXPLORATION

ALTHOUGH New Guinea was discovered in 1511, and the Spaniard Torres touched at the Louisiade group as early as 1606, little was known of the mainland, and nothing of even the fringe of the interior, when the two pioneers of the London Missionary Society, Rev. A. W. Murray and Rev. S. Macfarlane visited Yule Island and Redscar Bay in 1871, on a voyage from the Loyalty Islands, to put native teachers on the islands in the Torres Straits.¹ There had been surveys of the southern coasts by various naval officers during the 'forties, and the Dutch had established some trading posts and missionary stations

¹ Rev. J. King (at one period Australasian Organizing Agent of the L.M.S.) attributes the first suggestion that the L.M.S. should undertake work in New Guinea to a conversation between Captain Banner, a trader, and the Rev. J. Jones in 1866. The latter brought it before the L.M.S. Foreign Secretary in 1870. (*W. G. Lawes of Savage Island and New Guinea.* J. King, 1909, p. 48.)

on its north-western shores; and in 1873-74 Captain J. Moresby carried out a more elaborate survey of the south-eastern coast, hoisting the flag on Hayter Island; but before the advent of the missionaries no serious attempt was made to open up "this vast unknown country," as Rev. W. W. Gill described it to the Colonial Treasurer in 1873.¹

In 1872 Murray started superintending mission work from Cape York; two years later he was joined by Rev. S. Macfarlane and Rev. W. G. Lawes; and at the same time the steamer *Ellengowan* was given to the mission by a Miss Baxter of Dundee. In 1874 Lawes landed at Port Moresby, and in 1877 the Rev. James Chalmers joined him. Macfarlane, Lawes and Chalmers were the leaders of Protestant missionary enterprise in New Guinea; and from the first they showed themselves eager to make their religious work an excuse for adventurous exploration with results which, if not as important as the political influence they wielded, were by no means negligible. Indeed the missionaries received the thanks of the President of the Royal Geographical Society as early as 1875, two years before Chalmers had started his fine achievements.² Some of these achievements were recounted by the Hon. Secretary of the Royal Australian Geographical Society, in a paper read before a general meeting of the Society in 1883, when he gave to the missionaries an important place in the history of New Guinea exploration. He recalled Chalmers's attempt in 1879 to cross the Owen Stanley Range, and the "splendid view" he had obtained of a country which, in Chalmers's own phrase, "had no equal in New Guinea." After referring to the discovery

¹ PP. 1876, c. 1566.

² Royal Geographical Society, February 22, 1875.

by Chalmers of the Laroki Falls, the lecturer went on to outline an ambitious scheme for future exploration, in which he allotted the missionaries a part. "As to the country between Port Moresby and the extreme south-east," he declared, "we may leave to them the task of completing our geographical knowledge of that part of New Guinea."¹

During the 'eighties the Proceedings of the R.G.S. (London) contained many communications from New Guinea missionaries.² Indeed, their enterprise contrasts strikingly with the sluggishness of the Dutch in the north-west, where Signor D'Albertis in 1872 found that from Sorong to Dorei the interior was entirely unexplored, "although Dutch missionaries had lived there for more than twenty years."³ But Chalmers in the second year of his appointment discovered and named more than ten separate hills or mountain ranges in the country north of the Papuan Gulf.

The Roman Catholic missionaries to Eastern New Guinea followed gallantly in the steps of the first Protestant pioneers. In the report of the Special Commissioner for 1888 it is noted that the "French Catholic Missionaries at Yule Island are likely to be useful pioneers" . . . they "have explored the San Joseph River";⁴ the firstfruits of which are seen in the report of the following year, which contained detailed information for the Government about the land, climate and population of this district.⁵

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 23, 1883. Also R.G.S., 1880, ii. p. 315.

² E.g., *Account of the Kemp-Welch River*, by Rev. T. Beswick. R.G.S., 1880, ii. p. 511.

³ *What I Did and What I Saw*. L. M. D'Albertis, 1880, i. p. 208.

⁴ PP. 1889, c. 5620-3, p. 9.

⁵ PP. 1890-91, c. 6269-5, and PP. 1891, c. 6323, pp. 150-161.

It is true that the claims of the missionaries were sometimes extravagant. For Chalmers, on the return of Theodore Bevan in 1887, who had discovered and explored the Douglas and Queen's Jubilee Rivers for nearly a hundred miles, chose to minimize the value of this enterprise, declaring "that nearly seven years ago I had named much that Mr Bevan has now named."¹ A bitter controversy followed, which was revived by Lawes a year later, when the President of the Royal Geographical Society of Australia supported Bevan, demolishing Lawes's case and showing that the Wickam River of Chalmers was but a mouth of the Queen's Jubilee, up which Chalmers had only claimed to go ten miles, whereas it was found by Bevan to be thirty miles long. The President added: "Mr Chalmers's accounts are characterized by a vagueness that greatly detracts from their geographic value."²

This criticism is sufficiently just perhaps to have finality, but it in no way detracts from the political value of Chalmers's exploration work. Chalmers, and other missionaries such as Lawes who were less prominent in this field, were interested not so much in the shape of a mountain or in the depth of a river, as in the fact of their existence and of their consequent influence upon the mission. Mountains were viewed as obstacles to communication between districts, but also as bearing upon their slopes, just as rivers did upon their banks, hitherto unknown villages which provided new opportunities. During a cruise along the south coast in 1878, out of two hundred villages which were communicated with, ninety were visited for the first time by a white

¹ *Autobiography and Letters*. J. Chalmers, edited by R. Lovett, 1902, p. 293.

² *British New Guinea*. Theodore Bevan, 1890, pp. 185-210.

man, and the diaries of all his expeditions show Chalmers to have been viewing every place he visited as a possible new field of labour. "Gimenumu will make a fine mission station," he writes in 1879; "a large village 1900 feet up; fine plantations and plenty of water." He was interested, too, in trading possibilities, noting sago in large abundance in the villages on the banks of the river he named Coombes, and elsewhere, and foretelling that "a very large trade will yet be carried on by foreigners in the Gulf in sago and copra."¹

He has information, too, for prospective settlers, noting carefully the healthy and fertile districts, such as about Kivori, where he found "well-kept plantations in the hills." In addition, he writes of the flora, notes the presence of elephantiasis in one district, and utters a warning as to the presence of a treacherous tribe.²

Such diverse information, it may be argued, any explorer is expected to give; but it must be remembered that Chalmers was a "pioneer missionary" and made "no pretence to be a pioneer explorer."³ Thus writes one of his critics, and he has the evidence of Chalmers's writings to support him. In 1878 the missionary wrote that he still had a desire to cross the Peninsula to Huon Gulf, not as explorer but as missionary, "but I do wish to know all there is to be known about New Guinea," he adds.⁴ Nine years later, in describing some of his early expeditions, he asserted that their aim was to discover suitable spots for mission stations and for native teachers.⁵ There were some, however, who con-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 123, 137, 150.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 108, 141, 142.

³ Hon. Sec. R.G.S. (London), quoted by Bevan, *loc. cit.*, p. 264.

⁴ *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*, p. 190.

⁵ *Pioneering in New Guinea*, 1887, p. 1.

sidered that he made a better explorer than those who liked to claim the title.¹ Certainly he covered more ground than many of them. Deputy-Commissioner Romilly declared with his accustomed vigour that "the conceit of these so-called explorers made him very angry,"² all the more because they rarely mentioned the missionaries, "the source of most of their information."³

Even if the geographic value of his work may have been slight, as some of his critics held, the value of the political information collected by him and other missionaries cannot be denied, for they are cited as authorities, not only in the press by political controversialists,⁴ but also by Government departments,⁵ and by administrators⁶ in official correspondence. Both Lawes and Chalmers

¹ Deputy-Commissioner Romilly Reports, November 1883. Armit of the *Argus* reached a point forty miles from coast, which had been previously visited by Mr and Mrs Lawes. He suffered severely from fever, and one of his party died. "These private expeditions led by men of no experience will do much harm if any more should be organized." PP. 1884, c. 4126, pp. 17, 18.

² *Letters and Memoir* (1893), p. 194.

³ *The Western Pacific and New Guinea* (1886), p. 242. Hugh Romilly.

⁴ E.g., In a strong article in the *National Review* of September 1887 in favour of annexation, W. D. Hay quotes Chalmers's statement that there were possibilities of successful sugar, coffee and cotton planting in the island, and recalls his estimate of the density of population ("really scanty, about 200,000") to show that fears on this score were groundless.

⁵ E.g., A paper by Rev. W. Gill read before the R.G.S. in 1874 was cited by the Admiralty to the Colonial Office, September 22, 1875 (PP. 1876, c. 1566).

⁶ E.g., In the report of the Special Commissioner for 1888 (PP. 1889, c. 5620-3), pp. 65, 66, Deputy-Commissioner A. Musgrave encloses a report of a lecture by Rev. S. Macfarlane declaring, *inter alia*, that the colony could be made self-supporting, emphasizing this by a letter from Capt. C. Bridge, R.N., in agreement, who states that his opinion had been "confirmed by several conversations with my distinguished friend Mr Chalmers."

described in much detail the character, customs, and manner of life of the natives with whom they came in contact,¹ so that no one visiting those tribes as Government official or merely as adventurer could complain that he need lack knowledge of the conditions he was entering, or of the manner in which the missionaries had successfully faced them. "To them we are indebted," declared La Meslee, "for the knowledge we possess of the inland tribes around Port Moresby,"² that settlement of the London Missionary Society which was destined to become before long the seat of government, and principal port of British New Guinea.

Indirectly also, exploration owed much to the missionaries. Something of the initial stimulus came from them. D'Albertis attributes to Macfarlane the first suggestion of exploring the Fly River;³ Mr Lindt suggests that a conversation with Lawes and a promise of hospitality in 1885 encouraged him to visit New Guinea;⁴ and a letter of Chalmers to the "Town and Country Journal" in 1878 was described to the Secretary of State as "very favourable to the country," and "certain to stimulate of (*sic*) new the zeal of all the adventurers in Australia."⁵

¹ E.g., *Notes on New Guinea and its Inhabitants* in R.G.S., 1880, ii. p. 602, dealing chiefly with the inhabitants under headings such as native customs, occupations, houses, canoes, government, moral condition.

Pioneering in New Guinea, J. Chalmers, 1887, pp. 162-188, in which the customs, habits and beliefs of the Motumotu and Motu tribes are tabulated in a manner very useful to traders and administrators.

² *Sydney Morning Herald*, *loc. cit.*

³ *Loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 3.

⁴ *Picturesque New Guinea*. J. W. Lindt (1887), Preface.

⁵ Acting-High Commissioner Gorrie to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, October 14, 878. (PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 87.)

Many explorers could not have reached New Guinea as easily and safely as they did had not passages been given to them in the mission steamer *Ellengowan*. Octavius Stone in 1875, Goldie in 1877, Armit in 1885, and others made use of the steamer; and indeed both D'Albertis and Stone in 1875 went in her with Macfarlane on exploring trips to the Fly River and Stone to the Baxter River.

Travellers were always certain to receive help and hospitality at the missionary stations. It is rarely indeed that a book on travel in British New Guinea does not contain a grateful tribute to the kindness of the missionaries. Dr Otto Finsch, who in 1882 found at Port Moresby "an excellent field for his anthropological studies . . . thanks to the little interference with native customs on the part of the missionaries," acknowledges "a friendly welcome," an empty house being placed at his disposal.¹ Macfarlane in the early days at Somerset provided Stone with stores in the absence of some ordered from Brisbane, in order that the expedition of September 1875 should not be indefinitely delayed. It is not necessary to multiply instances. For our purpose the attitude of the missionaries to strangers has been adequately summed up by the Chairman of a Royal Commission in 1906. "Their homes," declared Colonel Mackay, "have always been centres of hospitality . . . while their wives have nursed many a fever-stricken wanderer back to health."²

And these relatively unimportant acts ought not to be forgotten; for they must have had a cumulative influence on the enterprise of those who sought trade,

¹ R.G.S., vi., 1884, p. 38.

² *Across Papua*. Col. K. Mackay (1909), p. 40.

specimens, or adventure in New Guinea, and they must have helped to lessen the creaks of the crude machinery of civilization in its irregular advance. Advice and warning as to the best way to approach the savage inhabitants no doubt gained added force in coming from those who showed such a sincere desire to soften the process of invasion, not merely for the invaded, but also for the invader.

CHAPTER II

THE ANNEXATION CONTROVERSY

By their services of exploration the missionaries prepared the way for the expansion of a European race in New Guinea. They were the first to penetrate the barrier of mystery which had protected the savage race living there from European visitors,¹ and they placed the knowledge thus gained at the disposal of any lay explorers who needed it.

A writer in the 'sixties drew attention to the reports of navigators that it was "a rich and magnificent country," but added that "at present the hostile disposition of its savage occupants renders it inaccessible to European explorers." Fears such as these delayed the exploration of the country until the missionaries visited it, who, although more concerned to gain converts than to make geographical discoveries yet, incidentally to their main purpose, acted as explorers. In this way they did much to remove the feeling of awe with which this cannibal land had been regarded, and to foster in the public mind a feeling of confidence in the possibilities of its colonization.

Although there is sometimes a tendency to overrate the dangers to which pioneer missionaries are exposed, in the case of those who went to New Guinea it must be remembered, to their credit, that the current opinion of the

¹ *Australia : Its Rise, Progress and Present Condition.* W. Westgarth, 1861, p. 132.

savagery of the inhabitants was such that, when the Colonial Secretary told the New Guinea Company in 1867 that adventurers "must neither look for aid nor protection from the national forces," the Company thought the risks too great to proceed with the enterprise.¹

And in 1874 the Governor of New South Wales, in reply to the request of Lord Carnarvon for his opinion upon annexation, said: "At present there is not throughout the whole of New Guinea one European resident, not even a missionary, and the Papuans are savages of a type which experience has shown . . . incapable of becoming civilized." He laid great stress upon the fact that the inhabitants were "warlike cannibals."²

In December 1874, however, the London Missionary Society moved the headquarters of the mission from Cape York to Port Moresby, and in 1877 Lawes was joined there by Chalmers, who lost no time in showing that by approaching the natives in a friendly and not a menacing manner it was possible to explore the country and to live there, if not in security, at least in comparative safety.

The effect was immediate. Individual adventurers such as Goldie, and, early in 1878, gold prospectors, were no longer afraid to enter the country,³ and fresh interest was aroused in Australia by the reports sent back by the missionaries of the possibilities of developing the country, and of civilizing the natives hitherto believed to be "incapable of becoming civilized."

The Council of the Royal Colonial Institute seized the opportunity to re-open the annexation controversy, by arguing that as the Papuan was now being brought more in contact with white men the question of the control of

¹ PP. 1876, c. 1566, p. 27.

² September 7, 1874. PP. 1876, c. 1566, p. 12.

³ See *post*, p. 76.

this increasing influx had become acute.¹ And Mr F. P. Labilliere, who had originally opened the question,² was able to reply³ to Sir H. Robinson's statement of 1874 that not even a missionary was in the island, by pointing out that "now several missionaries have been for some time permanently established there."

The stimulus which Chalmers gave to the movement for annexation was thus important, but it was from the first, and continued to be until the final decision, the stimulus of example. For Chalmers's name hardly figures at all in the correspondence of the annexation controversy.

Other missionaries, however, took a prominent part in it and supported those who pressed for annexation with the same kind of arguments. These were mainly three.

First, the strategic argument—that, should a foreign power obtain command of Torres Straits and of the harbours of New Guinea, British commerce would be endangered, since traffic through the straits was said to be rapidly increasing.⁴

Secondly, the necessity to control immigration in order to avoid evils brought upon the native population of other islands such as Fiji, where the whites had first entered uncontrolled.⁵

Thirdly, the possibility of a foreign power making a penal settlement there, with its resulting menace to the order and security of Australian colonists.⁶

¹ July 9, 1878. PP. 1883, c. 3617.

² March 26, 1874. PP. 1876, c. 1566.

³ September 18, 1878. PP. 1883, c. 3617.

⁴ Labilliere to Ld. Carnarvon, *loc. cit.* PP. 1876, c. 1566. A. Michie, Agent-General Victoria at the R.C.I., March 16, 1875. Sir P. Scratchley. *Australian Defences and New Guinea*, G. K. Cooke, 1887, pp. 243-257.

⁵ Labilliere, *loc. cit.*, 1874.

⁶ A point first raised by Rev. W. W. Gill to Colonial Treasurer, January 28, 1873, cited by Sir H. Robinson, *loc. cit.*, September 7, 1874.

It appears that of these three the first carried most weight, and in fact the actual decision of Queensland to take formal possession was justified to the home Government on the grounds that it was necessary "to prevent foreign powers from taking possession."¹

It is interesting to notice that missionaries like Gill and Macfarlane, who were eager for annexation, did not lay stress upon the second argument, but grasped clearly the political as distinct from the ethical issues involved, and spoke and wrote from the orthodox political standpoint. Hence they often took the political view of missionary work and saw the value of the latter in its ability to "open up the country." This was the phrase used in a discussion at the Royal Geographical Society in 1873 by Rev. S. Macfarlane, who recognized the strategic value of New Guinea, and emphasized its wealth, including gold, but thought that missionary enterprise was first necessary.² A little over a year later, during a discussion provoked by a paper from Captain Moresby, the President of the R.G.S. took a similar view and thought that England should be content with a gradual progress achieved by the pioneers, such as the missionaries.³ Thus both regarded the missionaries as the forerunners of British Imperialism.⁴

Again, Sir H. Robinson, in his unfavourable comment upon the annexationist policy (September 7, 1874), enclosed for the information of Lord Carnarvon a letter written to the Colonial Treasurer by Rev. W. W. Gill (January 28, 1873), who suggested that the time for British expansion in New Guinea had not yet arrived.

¹ Hansard, 1883, v. 278, c. 324, Agent-General to Lord Derby.

² R.G.S., November 24, 1873.

³ *Ibid.*, February 22, 1875.

⁴ Compare *ante*, pp. 10-18.

"Meantime," Gill added, "we hope gradually by missionary and colonial enterprise to open up this vast unknown country."

Gill made his attitude perfectly clear by stating that he wrote "as an Englishman" rather than "as representing any religious society," and as one who hoped that "should our missionary enterprise happily succeed, the interests of English colonization and civilization will be effectually promoted." And he declared emphatically that New Guinea should be kept free from any foreign power. "At any cost (save the dire curse of war)," he urged, "let not the rich prize fall into other hands."¹

Although, as the controversy developed, the missionaries came to lay more stress upon the second argument, the protection of the natives—Lawes for instance made the influx of gold-seekers a reason for demanding the establishment of British authority in New Guinea²—with the exception of Chalmers they never did more than lend support to the arguments used by administrators and other laymen,³ and their peculiar profession failed to lend a distinctiveness to their point of view.

To Chalmers the problem appeared in quite a different

¹ PP. 1876, c. 1566. See *ante*, p. 56.

² PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 100. Received at the C.O., January 31, 1879, by which time the Secretary of State had already informed Sir A. Gordon (December 31, 1878) that in consequence of the final failure of the gold expedition in October it was now "unnecessary to entertain the question of the annexation of New Guinea."

³ *E.g.* Rev. H. R. McDonald, a missionary, addressed a meeting in Melbourne, July 16, 1883, and supported the Mayor in a deputation afterwards to the Governor of Victoria. PP. 1883, c. 3814, p. 4, and PP. 1884, c. 3863, p. 11. See *ante*, pp. 40, 41.

A resolution was laid before the Inter-Colonial Convention, November 11, 1883, from three religious bodies, and included a letter from J. G. Paton. PP. 1884, c. 3863, pp. 153, 161.

light. The important question for him was not Who should govern New Guinea, but How New Guinea should be governed. His influence in deciding the first question was probably negligible; but it was very far from negligible in deciding the second.

It is curious that Chalmers, who was not much interested in the first, apart from its connexion with the second, should have been mainly responsible for raising it by the stimulus given to enterprise by his active work in New Guinea. Unconsciously and unwillingly he had cut a path for his countrymen to enter, and trade, and settle, in their own interests, when he had only thought of making a channel along which the interests of the natives could be served.

The view of Chalmers was radically different from that of the imperialist missionaries. For, like Marsden, he took an ethical and religious view of politics, judging political action, such as annexation, by the criterion of its effect upon the native race whether it would aid or hinder them in their progress towards the ideal of a Christian nation, and refusing to consider the introduction of Christianity as a method of preparing the way for British expansion.

Chalmers could not change his ideal by speaking, "not as representing any religious society,"¹ and where Gill was fired with patriotic enthusiasm, Chalmers was most eloquent when he pleaded for the interests of New Guinea, "the land of his adoption."²

But although, like Marsden, he could never have acquiesced in a cross raised by a British missionary as a symbol of British political dominion after the manner of Magellan, yet the intervening years since Marsden saw

¹ Rev. W. Gill, *loc. cit.*

² *R.C.I.*, January 11th, 1887, vol. xviii. p. 104.

the British flag as a symbol of Christian politics had left behind them disappointment and bitterness, and Chalmers could hold no illusions about the evils possible under British rule.

Although he was reconciled to the Protectorate by the manner in which Commodore Erskine had proclaimed it, and by the pledge contained in the proclamation, yet he could not control an expression of his almost cynical view of British expansion when the British flag was hoisted on the top of Cloudy Mountain, and wrote in his journal, "In solitude as well as busy scenes Britain's voice must be heard! Some Britons think the world was made for the Anglo-Saxon."¹

Chalmers had only one desire, to serve the natives and to bring them to see the Christian vision, and around that aim all his sympathies were centred and, for its achievement, he was ready to use any method which proved suitable.

Unlike the missionaries of Rotumah he realized that mental and industrial development were equally necessary to the native as conversion, while in contrast to Macfarlane, who noted the wealth of the country, and believed the conversion of the natives would enable his countrymen to possess it, Chalmers saw in commerce with the natives, under restriction, a means of civilizing them. "Teach our natives, encourage them in trade," he said, "and I feel sure they will never want your charity."²

Every factor in the position or prospects of the country was fitted by Chalmers into his plan to develop New Guinea for the natives and by the natives; and he hoped that no attempt would be made to force British civiliza-

¹ *Pioneering in New Guinea*, p. 196.

² January 11, 1887, *R.C.I.*, vol. xviii. p. 105.

tion upon them, but that "a more suitable and better civilization should be theirs." ¹

This was the distinctive background to Chalmers's opinion of the three arguments used in favour of annexation, and explains his neglect to take a prominent part in the annexation controversy, which was to settle Who was to govern New Guinea, and not How it was to be governed.

Because Chalmers made the fulfilment of the pledge the aim of policy he was non-committal in his view upon annexation when he made his only important considered statement upon it.

"If for the sake of defending our colonies from foreign aggression," he declared, "a protectorate is sufficient to prevent the intrusion of another power, I would advocate leaving N.G. under the protectorate, *provided that it is possible to carry out the proclamation*. If, on the other hand, annexation would be a *benefit* to the natives and a necessity to Australia, I would support the proposal to annex the country." ²

Thus in Chalmers's eyes it was not a sufficient recommendation that the protection of the native should follow upon annexation. To be justified annexation must "benefit" the natives. He thought always more of the duty the white race owed to the brown than of the rights which might be asserted by the white race without doing harm to the other.

The avowed imperialists, both lay and missionary, took a negative view of the rights of the native, and considered that justice was done if those rights, as conceived by themselves, were not injured in the carrying out of their positive policy, which was to seize and develop the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, p. 104. (Italics are the author's.)

country in their own national interests. Chalmers, on the other hand, took a positive view of the rights of the native, and believed that it was unjust to the native to stop short at protecting them from oppression, and that the chief duty of the expanding race was to educate as well as to protect the native, and that its own alleged right to share in the prosperity caused by the development of the country, and by the civilizing of the inhabitants, did not exist apart from its duty to them, and lapsed if it became inconsistent with that duty.

He was strengthened in his position by the arguments the annexationists put forward. These laid much stress on the strategic value of New Guinea, upon the importance of its position rather than of its soil or of its labour, and they were more concerned to keep Germany and France from fortifying its harbours or from placing a penal settlement there, than to make use of the resources of the country. So that Chalmers must have felt that his audience at the Royal Colonial Institute would not be unsympathetic to him when he declared: "Annexation cannot be asked for on the plea of need for land. We need no more territory whilst Australia . . . is still unoccupied and will be so for another century." He was afraid annexation would lead to injustice towards the native, because "the young, pushing, daring Anglo-Saxon" would see in every native right an impediment to colonization.¹ From the time when he had realized that the strategic value of New Guinea might lead to its annexation,² he had also realized that because its value was mainly strategic, an unrivalled opportunity would be offered of governing it entirely for the benefit of the native inhabitants.

¹ January 11, 1887, *R.C.I.*, vol. xviii., p. 104.

² *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, p. 17.

It is not, however, entirely true to say that Chalmers was uninterested in the question of Who should govern New Guinea. For instance, he supported Lawes against it being "handed over to the tender mercies of Queensland." ¹

But he was only interested in Who should govern it as far as it affected the possibility of its good government. This is where his view contrasts vividly with the Imperialist. For the latter was content to leave the question of How the country was to be governed until the first question was settled—being prepared to stake a decision upon the question Who? upon grounds of Imperial policy. For if the Imperialist ever thought of the effect alternative forms of government would have upon New Guinea itself, he did not speculate upon the future of the native, but upon the future of the settlers there, separated from Queensland by a comparatively short extent of sea. Much of the desire to protect the native from outrage came from the wish to protect the traders from reprisals, and not from any strong sympathy with the native race. In fact, Lord Derby stated that prior to the independent action of Queensland, the Agent-General for that colony had put before him amongst other arguments in support of annexation, that since New Guinea was practically beyond the reach of British law it was becoming or was soon likely to become the resort of bad characters of all kinds, and these might become "a serious source of annoyance to the Colonies." ²

Had Chalmers and not Archer put forward arguments for annexation on that occasion he would have said that the bad characters were likely to become a serious source of annoyance *to the natives*.

¹ Chalmers's *Autobiography*, p. 238.

² April 20, 1883. Hansard, 278, c. 728.

It is possible to argue that Chalmers was conceited in imagining that Lawes and he were "the only possible interpreters" and "alone" had the confidence of the natives.¹ But that he agreed with Lawes in preferring Crown Colony rule when there was a prospect of Queensland controlling the country;² and that, when this prospect faded, he was inclined to prefer a protectorate governed by a Special Commissioner, to Crown Colony rule,³ does not show him to have been inconsistent as well as conceited. For from the start he never moved from the position that it was the interests of the native race that were important, and that any form of government which insured the full performance of what he considered to be the duty of a Christian nation to the native race was worthy of support.

Perhaps too much space has been devoted to an attempted explanation of Chalmers's attitude to the annexation controversy, but it is his attitude to that controversy which gives the key to the nature of his influence upon the colonial statesmanship of his day.

¹ Chalmers's *Autobiography*, p. 261.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

³ *R.C.I.*, January 11, 1887, p. 13.

CHAPTER III

PEACEMAKING

THE missionaries resident in New Guinea, led by Chalmers, endeavoured from the first to secure that British immigration should be an inflowing of educators rather than exploiters. The problem of adjustment arising out of the impact of a "civilized" upon a "savage" race demanded a solution in the Pacific long before the Government became officially the source of energy behind the immigration. In the case of New Guinea the missionaries did much towards solving the problem before the protectorate was established, and aided the Government to find a more complete and perfect solution afterwards. Their influence took both a direct and an indirect form.

Their influence was direct in that they impressed the natives by their patience and devotion, that the white men were their friends, and also by their advice and practical assistance they induced the white men to assume and maintain an attitude of friendship towards the natives.

It was indirect in that they pulled political strings to effect this whenever direct influence was found to be impotent.

As it has already been pointed out, much of the original exploration work in what afterwards became British New Guinea was undertaken by the missionaries, so that the natives of a great part of the island came first in

contact with the nobler representatives of Western civilization.

It was well for British New Guinea that this was so. Even in the history of this fortunate dependency however there is ample evidence of the difficulties bequeathed to the Government by the ill-considered action of lay pioneers.

The chief characteristic of both the Polynesian and the Papuan is "a shy suspicious timidity,"¹ which renders them ready to use their weapons on a stranger. This is coupled with a vivid memory of injuries committed against them.² It was, therefore, of more than usual importance in this case, that the first white men with whom the natives came in contact should do nothing to stimulate the immediate suspicion of the inhabitants from fear to hatred, but rather should do their utmost to allay that suspicion. Not merely disinterested motives in favour of what prove, too often, to be the unfortunate aboriginals, but also selfishly commercial motives should demand that tact and patience, rather than violence, be used in order to lay a secure foundation for future intercourse between the invaded and the invader.

But the ordinary explorer is sometimes unfortunately so intent upon his maps or his collecting-boxes, that, like D'Albertis, he is not greatly disturbed if he opens up the country "by frightening the natives away from

¹ *British New Guinea, Country and People*. Sir W. Macgregor, 1897, p. 36.

² "It is a humiliating but undoubted fact that the more natives have been in contact with white men the more difficult they are of access." This is explained, Romilly writes, by their vivid memory. "Those who have had no experience of white men have no injuries to avenge." (*Western Pacific and New Guinea*. H. H. Romilly, 1886, pp. 16, 17.)

their villages and ransacking them for specimens.”¹ Sir William Macgregor testified to the harm wrought by this explorer in a paper read before the Royal Geographical Society in 1895, declaring that even by that time the natives on the Upper Fly River, whose tribe had been in contact with D’Albertis in 1875, could not be trusted, but those near the frontier did not appear to be hostile.² Of other expeditions, that of the *Age* newspaper in 1883 failed with the loss of stores, and the wounding of its leader, owing to unwise use of firearms, and the neglect of a native warning;³ and that of H. O. Forbes in 1887 was cut short by flight from the opposition, aroused by the reckless violence of a member of the expedition towards a native.⁴ Even Theodore Bevan, who proudly claims to have carried out his expeditions successfully without having taken the life of a single native, supporting this with the testimony of the Hon. J. Douglas, on one occasion acted contrary

¹ Prof. Haddon to the R.G.S., February 25, 1895, quoted by Macgregor, *loc. cit.*, p. 97.

² Macgregor, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

The responsibility must unhappily be shared by Rev. S. Macfarlane, who suggested the first expedition in 1875, and accompanied it in the mission steamer *Ellengowan*, and apparently did not protest when at the very start D’Albertis frightened native canoes away by firing over and at them. (D’Albertis, *loc. cit.*, vol. ii. pp. 21, *et seq.*)

³ Deputy-Commissioner Romilly reports, November 20, 1883, to Acting-High Commissioner for Western Pacific. PP. 1884, c. 4126, pp. 17, 18.

“The two so-called exploring expeditions have done no good. One of them has unfortunately done much harm” . . . “Morrison, a boy of twenty-one, of the *Age*, reached a point “certainly not more than 22 miles from the coast” (though he claimed to have gone nearly 100 miles from the sea). “He arrived at Port Moresby wounded in two places. His rifles and ammunition fell into the hands of the natives.” (Morrison afterwards achieved fame as the Pekin correspondent of *The Times*.)

⁴ Report of Special Commissioner. PP. 1888, c. 5249-31, pp. 64-68.

to the advice of those who were doing their best to prepare the country for settlement without bloodshed, by going upon a trading trip to a hostile district in defiance of a warning from an official, considering it a case for "self-assertion." But both he and others were fortunate in apparently not having to pay for such recklessness.¹

Fortunately for British New Guinea, although it was reported by a visiting correspondent that the relations of exploring parties with the natives in some instances "have been very unfriendly," and that "the effect of this on the native mind is lasting," these instances were the exception rather than the rule.² And this it cannot be too often repeated, was a vital matter, for in a savage country the echoes of a shot fired at random do not die away in a single generation, or sound only in a small district, but the whisper is heard by natives a hundred miles away, and animates the revengeful club or spear perhaps more than thirty years later.

The reason for such bitterness being largely saved to New Guinea was not only that so much of the original exploration work was carried out by Chalmers, but that both he and Lawes assisted other explorers by advice, by practical help, and by the extent of their influence even in villages which had never seen them.³ Well might La Meslee declare that the advent of the missionaries marks a new period in the history of New Guinea

¹ *British New Guinea*. T. Bevan, 1890, p. 137, *et seq.*

² C. Lyne, *New Guinea*, 1885, p. 229.

³ Strangers are asked if they know Tamate; if so, are treated with kindness. To many tribes who have never seen him he is "a mighty sorcerer," and all like to inquire about him. Sir Peter Scratchley (Special Commissioner for British Protectorate, 1885), *Australian Defences and New Guinea*, *loc. cit.*, p. 360.

exploration. "To the great credit of the missionaries, their efforts have been attended with the best effects; the Papuans have been made to understand the pacific intentions of the white man."¹

Chalmers was not content with giving advice upon the spot to those who sought it, but gave it wider circulation in 1885, by publishing papers, containing detailed information for prospective visitors, how to approach natives for the first time, how to avoid arousing suspicion by thoughtless acts, how to recognize signs of friendship or of hostility in the position and movement of their weapons, in their dress, in the action of a limb or the glance of an eye, emphasizing the fact that armed natives are not necessarily hostile, but uttering an oft-repeated warning to "get away as quickly and quietly as possible" at the first hint of danger.² That such advice was timely was shown the same year by the murder of Captain Fryer and three others, who met their death as the result of negligence and rashness.³

Sometimes the missionaries had to try to repair the harm caused by those who acted thus. As soon as Morrison returned with news of failure, and of a brush with the natives, Chalmers left for the Varigadi villages, to inquire the reason for the hostility of the natives, and

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 26, 1883. La Meslee recalled that Alexander Morton, the naturalist, who accompanied Goldie in 1877, was asked by the timid natives whether they were friends of Lawes, and on hearing so, "they immediately became friendly." "The missionary referred to had never been in this part of the district, but his name was known to the natives as a byword of peace, and the simple fact that the white men were his friends was sufficient to ensure a good reception."

² *Pioneering in New Guinea*, 1887, pp. 66, 129-132.

³ For an account of the inquiry into Fryer's murder, see PP. 1886, 51-Sess. II., p. 36.

to make peace with them, and to re-establish their confidence in the white man.¹

That Chalmers in his own exploration work practised, as well as taught, the peaceful method of approaching the natives, is borne out by the resulting devotion of those who knew or heard of him.² Something of the story of it can be found by the curious in his published letters and writings. Let it suffice here to lay stress on the importance he attached to going amongst the natives unarmed, and trusting to presence of mind, and a quick, vivid imagination to save him in danger.³ "I can do more for the natives unarmed," he wrote; and so he went amongst them with a walking-stick.⁴

It may of course be objected that Chalmers carried his policy to the verge of rashness, and that he eventually paid for it with his life; but had he shown less courage or demanded less from those around him, he would probably only have purchased the immediate safety of himself and those he led, at the price of a long-continued hatred for white men in general on the part of the tribes,

¹ R.G.S., vol. vi., 1884, p. 217, and *Pioneering in New Guinea*, p. 124 seq.

² "The fame of Tamate has been noised abroad, so that people from China Straits and even from the Louisiade Archipelago visit him." H. M. Chester, Magistrate at Thursday Island to Colonial Secretary, Brisbane, August 30, 1878. (PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 80.)

³ *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, 1885, p. 213.

⁴ G. R. Askwith (Scratchley's Secretary) in *Australian Defences and New Guinea*, p. 360.

In December 1877 an attack was made upon the mission lugger *Mayri*, the captain of which was wounded. Chester, in forwarding the latter's report to the Colonial Secretary, Brisbane, added: "It appears they (the missionary party) have firearms but Mr Chalmers will not allow them to be loaded." No action was taken against the natives by H.M.S. *Sappho* beyond warning them. (PP. 1883, c. 3617, pp. 47-51.) See also Chalmers's *Autobiography*, pp. 146-151, and *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, p. 58-62.

so that New Guinea, like New Zealand, might have become later a battle-ground for the two races.

He certainly could never otherwise have obtained that influence over the natives which enabled him, and in a lesser degree, enabled Lawes to render such conspicuous service to explorers, and gold-seekers, and to the Protectorate.

The broad-minded religious policy of the missionaries increased, and helped to maintain the influence gained by their peaceful bearing. They came as educators as well as protectors, and they were careful not to render the principles they taught unpopular, by attempting to put savages, accustomed to licence, into the strait-waistcoat of European convention. They emphasized their creed, not by trying to enforce a rigid code of European manners, but by interpreting the Christian inspiration in terms suitable to a different climate and a different race.

Chalmers, after describing how he had joined with the natives in sports on shore and in bathing, declares : "All we want is to lead the New Guinea children to Him—by no means to Anglicize them, believing that He will receive them without their adopting English customs."¹ And he goes on to describe the method they must use to do this : cannibalism which flourished at East Cape in 1878, was dead by 1882, due to the missionaries "learning the language, mixing freely with them, making friends . . . assisting them in their trading, and in every way making them feel that their good only was sought."² This attitude Chalmers assumed from the moment he arrived in the South Seas. The Earl of Pembroke and George Kingsley threw an interesting

¹ *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, p. 250-252.

sidelight upon it when they were received by Chalmers and his wife at Rarotonga in 1873. "This warm-hearted sensible Highland lady and gentleman," they wrote, "are very different people from the typical missionaries of the South Pacific. . . . By no means believing that they can wash the brown-a-moor white by a sudden application of Calvinistic whitewash, they try to make him as good a brown-a-moor as they can, and their labour is certainly not in vain."¹

Chalmers himself did not attach very much importance to religious observances as evidence of the progress of the native, or as means towards that progress.² He was much more anxious that they should come to trust the white man through their experience of the missionaries' devotion, whose guidance was found to lead to a hitherto unknown security and prosperity. Provided that could be secured, he was not one who cared much for the conventional results of Christianity. Not, of course, that he neglected to preach the Gospel, but that he refused to regard the ceremonies and customs which have been gathered around it, as most important to the salvation of savages.

¹ *South Sea Bubbles*, 1873, pp. 158-197. There is a vivid description of an entertainment given in their honour in which Chalmers led a deputation of natives with gifts, "dressed principally in a white shirt, with a native cloak of many colours, barefooted, and bearing a weapon, half-paddle." He "frisked and bounded and . . . gasped and roared, and bellowed like the most Bashantic of bulls." . . . "Is it worse than whiskey and water, this harmless effervescence?" the writer asks. "All honour to you, M. le Missionaire, for your solid good sense."

² *E.g.* On one of his expeditions, the native paddlers made Sunday an excuse for putting in to land. Chalmers would have none of it. *Pioneering in New Guinea*, p. 28. When there is a good attendance at service, he only exclaims, "Alas, they are but savages . . . rejoicing in the prospect of an unlimited supply of tobacco, beads, and tomahawks." *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, p. 211.

Lawes was also quite definite upon this point. To those who demanded for them better clothes, and instruction in the common decencies of life, he replied that those agencies were not effective, that the savage was averse to clothing, and that "a savage in a shirt is no better than one without," and that "Christianity was the true civilizer."¹ The introduction of Christianity, however, was "no easy task."

The language difficulty could only be overcome by speaking the "one language which is understood all the world over by every tribe of men . . . the language of human kindness . . . the master key which fits every human lock." At first all they could do very often was to let the natives handle them, and feel them, and to give them a little present, and come away. Red beads, strips of cloth, and hoop iron thus became "evangelizing agents of far greater power than Bibles and tracts in an unknown tongue." "As soon as we have gained their confidence sufficiently to be allowed to land and live amongst them, the Christian work begins, not by oral teaching, but by that which is more important—by our life. We have to give them practical lessons in Christian living. . . . We do not neglect teaching . . . but it is not easy to awaken their interest or arouse their attention."²

Although this educational policy of the missionaries

¹ One wonders whether Lawes's view of the importance of clothes was modified by contact with Chalmers, who was opposed to the clothing of natives. In his earlier notes Lawes writes: "The people (on Niue, Cook Islands) when we first knew them, imported nothing and exported nothing. One native woman had a cotton print dress, and a very few men had cotton waist-cloths. When we left the entire population was decently and in some cases grandly clothed." (*W. G. Lawes, Joseph King, 1909, p. 40.*) Unfortunately this note is undated.

² Paper read to the L.M.S., May 15, 1879. (*W. G. Lawes, J. King, pp. 132-150.*)

can no doubt be criticized in detail¹ in its broad results, it was effective. The existence of the blood feud was the first chief obstacle to European expansion in New Guinea, the sanctity of human life was unknown, and the native had no more security for himself or his relatives than the white man who visited him. No doubt an enterprising Government, backed at home by a nation which was willing to pour out money on its behalf, could have conducted a successful war, and thus brought peace to

¹ Bevan made much of the fact that English was not taught in the schools. But great difficulty was found at first in teaching the natives to read in their own language at Port Moresby, and in replacing the many dialects by Motu language. By neglecting to teach English at first, the missionaries were able to concentrate more upon impressing new ideas by teaching them in a language already understood by many natives; they assisted the progress of friendly relations between tribes previously hostile to each other by teaching the Gospel to those individuals of them which met at Port Moresby, in a single native language; and they probably unwittingly made it almost imperative to Europeans who came to New Guinea to do business with the natives only through those who knew not merely the language but also their sensitive childish character, and who were thus able to watch effectively over critical moments, when the two races came in contact. Bevan also attacked the missionaries for not putting a stop to senseless superstitions, and enforcing "rules of sanitary science." Romilly claims the opposite in his book *From my Verandah in New Guinea*, 1889, pp. 76, 77; and in his report to the Special Commissioner (PP. 1888, c. 5249-31), writing that "the tribe at Port Moresby have come so much under the influence of the L.M.S. that they are discarding to a great extent their superstitions."

(Bevan, *loc. cit.*, p. 281. See also a report by Chester on the English classes in Port Moresby school, April 1883, in PP. 1883, c. 3691. Also Sir Peter Scratchley's Secretary on Lawes's school, 1885, in *Australian Defences and New Guinea*, *loc. cit.*, p. 359. For the difficulties found in teaching see Chalmers's *Autobiography*, p. 139, and Lawes, *loc. cit.*, p. 71, and also p. 121 for a description of Port Moresby as a centre for barter where "natives speaking eight different languages have sometimes been at the same time.") On the demand of Sir William Macgregor English was eventually taught in all mission stations. But the situation was then very different. (*R.C.I.*, vol. xxvi. p. 225, and *Official Handbook*, 1919.)

New Guinea by robbing the natives of their land and afterwards exterminating them, and replacing them possibly by coolie labour, but short of that, there was no other way of bringing civilization to the country except by very gradually raising the character of the native, and liberating him from the tyranny of savage tradition through the power of a genuine devotion to his welfare.¹

In the absence of lay pioneers, who were willing to do this, the missionaries did so ; and they did it more efficiently than others could have done, since they were always thinking not how much they could *take from* the natives, but how much they could *give* to them. That they thus prepared for the development of the territory as a British dependency, was an incidental result of their policy, and not the aim of it.

Although, as Lawes declared in 1879, the results of this somewhat unorthodox policy were largely intangible, and could not be tabulated statistically, and there were no baptized converts, yet the emphasis laid upon principles of life rather than upon dogma and European customs, was even at that date proving effective, so that Lawes could claim that the principles of peace were spreading, and that to a great extent they had "won the confidence of the people" ; being known all along the coast as "the men who bring peace." ²

¹ The somewhat youthful and explosive Bevan (born 1860), who claimed to be the first to champion the cause of the traders "against those who advocate keeping New Guinea for the New Guineans (and the missionaries)," declared that "the shiftless aboriginal," must learn "to bend his back to the yoke of Adam's curse or make room for those who will." *Loc. cit.*, pp. 273, 276.

² J. King, *loc. cit.*, pp. 145, 147. Chalmers writes in 1884, "We preach the Gospel in many ways ; one of our best at present is making peace between tribes." (*Autobiography*, p. 227.) Sir W. Macgregor reports in 1889 that the Papuan was not as yet "deeply impressed by the truths of the Gospel," but the labours of the missionaries "have to such an extent

This claim was abundantly justified at the time, and by events, and there is nothing more striking in this history than the general testimony to the influence of the missionaries as peacemakers.

Goldie reports to the Royal Geographical Society in 1878 that his "safety lay simply in the fact that Europeans had never harmed or done anything wrong to the coast tribes, the Rev. Lawes being the only European that had ever visited even the coast tribes, and his name at present acting as a password of safety."¹

Early in the same year, there occurred the first rush of gold-seekers to New Guinea, causing some anxiety lest conflict with the natives should result. The London Missionary Society brought the danger to the notice of the Colonial Office, which arranged for the despatch of a man-of-war to Port Moresby (July 6, '78), and Chester's powers as Police Magistrate at Thursday Island were temporarily extended by his appointment as a Deputy-Commissioner.² But all went well. Kindness and help by the one, and steadiness and gratitude by the others, enabled the missionaries and the diggers to be the best of friends. This was enough to obtain for the diggers the confidence and help of the natives. A report from H.M.S. *Sappho* forwarded a statement by a leader of the expedition telling of the good reception they received from the natives and of the influence Chalmers had upon the diggers. A service was held at Port Moresby, attended by them all without distinction of creed, at which Chalmers advised them modified the ways of thinking and the social relations of the natives that the good they have done is incalculably great." PP. 1890, c. 5897-33, p. 38.

¹ R.G.S., 1878, vol. xxii. p. 220.

² PP. 1883, c. 3617

both to have no religious discussion, as being likely to create division amongst them, and also to keep on good terms with the natives. He also visited the mining camp with Chester where he again impressed this upon them.¹ This advice and the fact that the diggers "were to a great extent dependent on the good offices of the natives for the means of subsistence when exploring for gold," resulted in their relations with the natives being "quite friendly."² Chalmers received a testimonial in gratitude from the diggers, who wrote: "You have in our intercourse with the natives aided us to establish a friendly footing." In July of the same year, the L.M.S. was asked by the miners and others, resident in Port Moresby, to send back to them Lawes (who was at that time in England) because of his influence with the natives.³

The same year Chester went with Chalmers on an expedition from South Cape to Milne Bay through a population of cannibals quite safely; which, Chester declares, was only made possible by the assistance of Chalmers and "the confidence with which he had inspired the natives."⁴

It made no difference to the determination of the

¹ PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 62. Corroborated by Chalmers's *Autobiography*, p. 134.

² The only serious incidents apparently were a case of rape of a native woman at Port Moresby, and a disturbance caused by the theatrical manner in which the confidential agent of the Queensland Government dealt with what the Acting-High Commissioner called "trifling acts of theft," by violence and a "parade of force." This the Commissioner much regretted, especially as the agent himself reported that the expedition felt a "perfect sense of security from harm as regards the natives." (PP. 1883, c. 3617, pp. 89, 54.)

³ Quoted by Lawes in a demand for annexation and forwarded to C.O. by Sir A. Gordon, January 31, 1879. (PP. 1883, c. 3617.)

⁴ Report, August 30, 1878. (PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 84.)

missionaries to act as peacemakers, when the hands of the home government were forced and a protectorate was established. Although they laid themselves open to the bitter attacks of those who wished to exploit the country and its inhabitants immediately, without any thought of duty to the native race, or of the permanent prosperity of the dependency, the missionaries continued to act as a moderating and curbing influence upon the savage passions of the natives, and upon the rashly adventurous spirit of some white men, and upon the greed of others.¹ To the representatives of the British and Queensland Governments they acted as wise counsellors, loyal interpreters, and staunch friends.

A short telegram from Commodore Erskine to the Admiralty, November 26, 1884, reporting the proclamation of the Protectorate was not so short that tribute could not be paid to the missionaries. "November 9, The Protectorate has been proclaimed," it reads, "(by) H.M.S. *Nelson*, British flag hoisted at nine places. . . . Received everywhere with satisfaction. The confidence (of) the natives is wonderful. Success is due (to) influence (and) assistance (of) missionaries."²

Another telegram dated January 19, 1885, reporting the extension of the Protectorate, reads, "Bridge reports Chalmers rendered excellent service."

But so impressed was the Commodore by the help

¹ In a cutting from the *Brisbane Courier* enclosed to Lord Derby by the Administrator of Queensland, Sir A. H. Palmer, October 24, 1883, there is a vivid picture of Chalmers "the tyrant missionary," as his enemies called him, "who will not be kept back" from asserting native rights when other missionaries were timid of stepping beyond their work. (PP. 1884, c. 3863.) Chalmers himself wrote in September 1883 that no amount of abuse would turn him from opposing those who were trying to exploit the country selfishly, and gloried in being called "the tyrant missionary." *Autobiography*, pp. 240-242.

² PP. 1885, c. 4273.

thus rendered to his command that in his written report he dealt at some length with it. He declared that his programme was only made possible by the "invaluable assistance of Chalmers and Lawes, and that the wonderful confidence shown by the natives must be entirely attributed to their influence."

"From the moment of my arrival," he continued, "these gentlemen have placed their invaluable services entirely at my disposal; they have been ready night and day to assist me in every possible way . . . in translating and explaining the terms of the proclamations and addresses . . . and in collecting the numerous chiefs, who but for them would never have come near the ship. These gentlemen . . . have by their firm, but conciliatory and upright dealing established such a hold over the natives as many a crowned head would be proud to possess. I have been lost in admiration at their influence. During our cruise it has happened that a boat has been sent in the middle of the night to bring off a chief; when it is imagined what it is to suddenly surprise and wake up the inhabitants of a native village, and for the chief to comply without demur to a request to go off immediately to a huge man-of-war, it will be understood what a magic effect is produced by a few words spoken by 'Tamate' (Chalmers) or 'Missi Lawes' (Lawes)." ¹

The Reports of the Governors of British New Guinea ²

¹ Enclosure in Admiralty to C.O., December 1884. (PP. 1885, c. 4273, p. 123.) This is corroborated by a correspondent of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, who was present at the declaration of the Protectorate and wished to see Chalmers amongst the natives and judge of his influence for himself. He owns to being astonished at Chalmers's power. *New Guinea*, C. Lyne, 1885, p. 68.

² Sir Peter Scratchley, Special Commissioner, August 22—December 2, 1885 (appointed October 1884). H. H. Romilly, Deputy-Commissioner, December 2, 1885—February 26, 1886. Hon. John Douglas,

are unanimous in their testimony to the peace-making influence of the missionaries.

"Peace is one great result of the missionary teaching," writes Sir Peter Scratchley's secretary, who recognizes the value of Chalmers's work and influence amongst the coast tribes, who had been perpetually at war before his arrival.¹

Dr Doyle Glanville, who was on Sir Peter's staff in '85, also bore witness to this.

"Was it not Tamate," he declared, "who turned their (the natives) quarrels into peace? Had not Tamate been known, when two opposing tribes were approaching, to go and take the two hostile chiefs like two turbulent children and insist upon their being friends and not fighting?" "Had it not been for that gentleman," he continued, "whatever work had been accomplished on the expedition could never have been done without his valuable help. His profound knowledge of the native character, his wide experience and his great tact placed us on a footing with the natives that otherwise would have been impossible." He taught the Commission how to understand the natives and the natives how to understand the motives of the visitors. . . . "Wherever the power of the missionaries is felt, there law, order, and peace are established." A mission village, even if presided over by a native teacher, was always safe for life and property. "Like a system of moral police, the missionaries establish a subtle, but very strong restraining influence that checks certain unprincipled persons and encourages honest traders and adventurers."²

Special Commissioner, February 27, 1886—September 3, 1888. Sir William Macgregor, Administrator of British New Guinea, September 4, 1888—March 13, 1895; Lieut-Governor, March 13, 1895—September 10, 1898.

¹ Scratchley's *Autobiography*, *loc. cit.*, p. 360.

² This very warm praise loses part of its value from the fact that Chalmers was present at this meeting and Glanville rose after a very

Thus in 1887 Scratchley was able to claim that "under present conditions a single white man unarmed can go fifty miles into the interior from any point between Port Moresby and Hula in perfect safety. Much of this is due to the native teachers." ¹

Deputy-Commissioner Romilly in 1885, when returning native labourers to their homes, felt the difficulty of his task increased by the absence of Chalmers, who was away exploring. So impressed was he by Chalmers's personality and work that he went so far as to say that the safety of many white visitors was due to the influence and assistance of the missionaries and that the success of future Government measures would be largely due to Chalmers, Lawes, and Macfarlane.²

The reports of the Hon. J. Douglas corroborate this. In that for 1887 it is noted that the natives of Manu-Manu "are now perfectly peaceable."³ In that for 1888 it is claimed that there had been no instance of outrage of white on native or *vice versa*, and that there had been no period during the last ten years when these relations had been on "a more friendly or satisfactory footing."⁴

And finally there is the evidence of Sir William eloquent speech by him; but even so with every allowance for the influence of the moment, it remains a striking tribute. *R.C.I.*, vol. xviii., 1886-1887, pp. 107-111. Scratchley, *loc. cit.*, p. 290.

¹ Scratchley, *loc. cit.*, p. 291.

² *Letters*, ed. S. H. Romilly, 1893, p. 228. *The Western Pacific and New Guinea*, 1886, p. 242.

³ PP. 1888, c. 5249-31, pp. 5, 7. It is only fair to note that the Government officials as well as the missionaries were peacemakers. G. Hunter is reported as having founded a Government station between Rigo and Kappa, and as having "exercised a considerable controlling influence over these tribes. It is quite certain that there are now much fewer acts of violence than there used to be."

⁴ PP. 1889, c. 5620-3, p. 3.

Macgregor, who reports in 1889 that there had been "very considerable progress by the L.M.S. in softening the manners" of the tribes in the Maiva and Kevori districts, although this "had not yet reached such a stage as to put a stop to the long-continued feud of the two septs."¹ The resident magistrate of the Central Division points out in the same report that native policy reflected the consideration shown to the natives in better relations between tribes and in a more friendly attitude to foreigners. The Saroa and Rigo people now fearlessly went to villages on the Kemp Welch River; Kapake people went to Aroma and Aroma people went to Port Moresby—visits mostly for the purpose of trading, a new and encouraging feature in native policy. He adds that "no foreigners have been molested in this district during the last year," and that explorers were treated everywhere with kindness and attention.²

Thus there is no lack of evidence to support the view of missionary policy taken by Sir William Macgregor when he declared that "its influence has sometimes prevented inter-tribal war and has reduced the frequency of murder, and in all cases tends to make the work of the magistrate lighter. Peace is easier to establish, and when established, is easier to maintain in a mission district than elsewhere."³

To recapitulate, the first and most important service that the missionaries rendered to the cause of British expansion in Papua was that of peacemaking.

After acting unconsciously, even one might say, un-

¹ PP. 1890-1891, c. 6269-5, pp. 25, 54.

² *Ibid.*, p. 53. Famine in the Rigo district was met by food being given in return for work, and in the case of the infirm, free. Lawes raised a fund for relief around Port Moresby.

³ Paper read before R.G.S., February 25, 1895, reprinted in *British New Guinea, Country and People*, 1897, p. 92.

willingly,¹ as a stimulus to expansion, their function changed. Once the check of a traditional fear had been removed, enterprising lay pioneers were certain to follow each other in a constantly increasing stream, which the missionaries would be powerless to stop. But in the absence of a government of any sort, theirs was the only moderating influence, the only external force which could direct the stream into peaceful channels.

Their will and their function therefore now became harmonized. Increasingly rapid immigration threatened to produce a crisis which would make difficult the gradual adjustment of New Guinea affairs by the missionaries. They therefore felt it their duty to check rather than stimulate the tide of adventurers.

Although Bevan writes with the exaggeration of a partisan, yet he was inaccurate in degree and not in fact when he represented the missionaries as being hostile to the immigration of settlers and traders.² It was fortu-

¹ The missionaries hoped to interest their countrymen in the land as fit for missionary stations, not as suitable for squatters; and in its population as heathen awaiting conversion, not as labourers without work. But their political significance in this case does not depend upon their motive.

² Occasional letters by missionaries upon the evil of the climate probably discouraged some. Macfarlane, in a letter published in the *Times*, October 6, 1875, emphasized the danger to emigrants of fever, and Lawes wrote in the *Australian Medical Gazette*, May 1887, "that New Guinea was entirely unfitted to be the home of the Anglo-Saxon" for that reason. Although A. Musgrave, in the Report for 1888 (PP. c. 5620-3), gave figures to disprove this, and Sir W. Macgregor, in the *Official Handbook* of the dependency, 1892, wrote that, "by reasonable care and by taking appropriate remedies whenever fever threatened, the danger from it to a person actively employed and otherwise healthy is not at all great"; yet at a meeting of the R.C.I., April 11, 1893, opinions of competent authorities were divided, and as late as 1907, the *Handbook* (page 9) declares that "a very great misconception appears to exist as to the unhealthiness of the climate for Europeans." That the missionaries had some good ground

nate for British New Guinea that they were, since peace was the more easily kept between a small number of white men and the natives, and under missionary influence the problem of the adjustment of the interests of the civilized and the savage race was solved gradually and peacefully, to the common good of both races, so that the foundations of the future prosperity of the dependency could be founded upon mutual confidence between the races, as far as such was obtainable, and not upon the bitterness resulting from a racial war.

Their value did not diminish when the country came under the control of administrators. By force of personality they were able to impress upon these the importance of not alienating the sympathy and respect of the natives, and their knowledge of native customs and of the native character enabled them to render invaluable assistance to the administration in putting this principle into practice. Perhaps they best protected the native from the ambition and the ignorance of the white man by explaining him to the latter. They protected the native to some extent from his own savagery by explaining to him the white man's intentions and deeds. Their genuine disinterestedness enabled them to retain the confidence of both races, so that they were enabled gradually to forge a link to join the two together in work for the dependency. Sometimes they may have acted with a prejudice for native interests, but if so, it was a good fault, for the native had no other champions, and might have been led to rely upon himself with the disastrous result of another native war. At least they never showed themselves so prejudiced that they forfeited the respect

for their fears is of interest but not of great importance. That their fears may have assisted to check a rush of settlers, however, was of very fortunate importance for the future of the dependency.

of the best white men. Although they were often violently attacked by those who had no interest beyond plunder, they and their successors have retained not merely the respect but the admiration of succeeding administrators.

This is not surprising, for it was due to the missionaries that the Administration possessed, as the native background for policy, respect and not hostility, and gratitude instead of bitterness.

CHAPTER IV

THE LABOUR TRAFFIC

THE determination of the missionaries to assert the rights of the natives against any white men desiring to exploit them, and to oppose the action of any individual or group which might react unfavourably upon friendly relations between the two races, is evident in the attitude adopted by them towards the labour traffic.

In the opinion of all those who were unprejudiced by self-interest, this traffic was a great obstacle to peace. Commodore Erskine indeed, in forwarding the appeal of the chiefs for its cessation, described it in 1884 as "the only obstacle in the way of friendly relations" as the natives had shown an implicit confidence in the protecting arm of Great Britain.

New Guinea suffered less than some islands, partly because its coasts were not surveyed until after the Pacific Islanders Protection Act of 1872 had enabled the Government to exercise some control over the traffickers, partly because the island was believed to contain a more than usually savage race of cannibals; and when, thanks to the missionaries, it became less dangerous to visit it, in another sense it became risky to do so owing to the alertness of Chalmers and Lawes to any invasion of the terms of the Act, and owing to their influence with high officials.

Yet New Guinea by no means escaped scot-free. Even Bevan, who rarely appears as witness for the native

against the white man, inveighs against the traffic, and admits that the narratives of "escapees" must have inflamed the natives against "their white seducers, oppressors, and aggressors," and quotes Captain Fryer as declaring that the suspicion aroused by labour vessels had made native labour unprocurable for *bêche-de-mer* trade, and that the latter had been almost crushed, adding that the labour traffic would cost "dozens of heads."¹ After the testimony of such a white partisan, it seems hardly necessary to refer for corroboration to official reports, such as that of Romilly for 1887, who attributed the change for the worse in the demeanour of the savages in the South-East Islands and Milne Bay during the previous six years to the work of the kidnappers.²

The missionaries played an important part in opposing the traffic. Not content with acting as a curb upon the activities of the slave-traders by the simple fact of their presence in a locality,³ and with occasionally rendering assistance to "escapees,"⁴ they put pressure upon the

¹ Bevan, *loc. cit.*, pp. 86, 105.

² PP. 1888, c. 5249-31.

³ The following question and answer are contained in the report of the inquiry conducted by Commodore Erskine into the *Hopeful* case.

Q. 17. "How did the white men treat the natives of the places they called at while you were on board?"

A. "As long as in reach of missionary they were not cruel, when away from reach of missionary they got guns and burnt villages, and got men by force." PP. 1885, c. 4273, p. 106.

⁴ E. F. Hely, a Government agent, declared during the same inquiry that through the influence of the Reverend S. Macfarlane (on Murray Island) he consented to take back some runaways to their home instead of to the plantation. See also *The Times*, December 5, 1884, for a letter of Lawes, describing the arrival of an "escapee" at Port Moresby, as a stowaway upon the *Ellengowan*, after being received kindly at Murray Island.

Government, informed public opinion of the facts, and used their personal influence with the local administrators.

The menace of the labour traders did not overshadow New Guinea until Queensland sent Chester to take possession on April 4, 1883; for the risks and difficulties were less at the smaller islands. But the supply was running out there, some islands, indeed, having become entirely depopulated; and rumours, exaggerated, no doubt, but partly true, reached the missionaries that Queensland desired possession in order that her labour ships might visit the coasts to secure cheap labour under the protection of the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific.¹

Chalmers, whose views upon the traffic are on record in a vigorous letter to a friend,² took immediate steps to lay the case of the natives before the Government of Queensland and the Government at home. In May he left for Queensland with Baron Maclay, and on his way thither with the latter, wrote a joint letter to Lord Derby, asking that not only might native rights in land be respected, but that both the liquor and the labour trade might be prohibited.³

He received a curt reply, dated September 3, 1883, that "H.M. Government are not prepared to enter upon considerations of questions relating to the land and natives of New Guinea at the present time."

For, in fact, the Government had only just begun to

¹ Chalmers's *Autobiography*, pp. 222, 237.

² We have had the man-stealers at the East End, but I hope their day is ending. They abuse me villainously, for which I am glad. One paper says that I teach the natives that white men are cannibals. I could truthfully teach them that they are fiends incarnate. I shall keep at it with home and the colonies until the horrible traffic is stopped. (*Autobiography*, p. 228.)

³ PP. 1884, c. 3863; also *Autobiography*, p. 240.

move in the direction of establishing a protectorate. In the debate in the Lords on July 2nd, the fear of annexation and the regulation of the labour traffic, on which opinion as to abuses was divided, were the chief notes of the debate. Lord Derby was characteristically cautious, and declined to favour an annexation policy.¹

On August 21, in the Commons, Mr Gorst noted the failure of the Pacific Islanders Protection Act of 1875, and asked what was the Government's policy in the face of the "frightful crimes" committed by both whites and natives? Hon. Evelyn Ashley, who replied, emphasized Lord Derby's despatch to the Governor of Queensland, by suggesting that a protectorate might gradually be established by increased naval activity in the neighbourhood. A committee was about to report.²

Chalmers's letter, therefore, which asked the Government to consider the manner in which the Protectorate should be governed, arrived when Lord Derby had not yet made up his mind whether a protectorate should be established,³ and probably received little notice. But for all that, historically it marks the start of an active campaign by the missionaries against any increase of the labour traffic in New Guinea, and in favour of its total abolition, a struggle in which they were eventually victors.

On arrival in Queensland Chalmers tried to convert

¹ Hansard, 1883, v. 281, c. 3.

² *Ibid.*, 1883, v. 283, c. 1549.

³ PP. 1883, c. 3691, Lord Derby was opposed to annexation, but would consider the question of a protectorate if Queensland would provide "a reasonable annual sum" (dated July 11, 1883).

On July 21 Lord Derby received a joint letter from the Agents-General of the Australian colonies advocating annexation not only on strategic grounds, but because "the state of things in the Western Pacific has at last become intolerable." PP. 1883, c. 3814.

both the Government and public opinion to his view. He writes in his journal that he had a long interview with the Premier, "a stubborn, good, honest Scotchman," extracting a promise from him that if coolies could be obtained the traffic would be stopped. He also interviewed the Leader of the Opposition, "editors of leading newspapers, and many other men of more or less influence," and he "addressed two large meetings at one of which the editor of a leading newspaper took the chair."¹

In November the Protectorate was proclaimed; and the task of the missionaries became easier, since their efforts could now be concentrated upon the British Government, which was now responsible, upon its servants, the officials of the Protectorate, and upon British public opinion.

Evidence of their new opportunity of influencing policy is contained in the very first telegram of Commodore Erskine, reporting the proclamation of the Protectorate. "The chiefs pray Her Majesty (to) cause natives that have been taken (to) Queensland (to) return home," he wrote, and then concluded with the tribute to the missionaries already quoted.² Bearing in mind the astonishing impression that Chalmers and Lawes made upon the Commodore, it is not unfair to deduce that this reference to the labour traffic was inserted in the telegram at the suggestion of the missionaries, who were the only interpreters available, and who would have been likely to have seized such an opportunity of pressing upon the home Government their point, that the labour traffic was the chief menace to the peace of the new Protectorate.

The following month a letter from Lawes appeared in

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 240.

² *Loc. cit.*, see *ante*, p. 79.

The Times. It was dated September 15, 1884, but between its despatch and its publication on December 5, the situation, as we have seen, had changed favourably for the missionary policy. The British Government could no longer silence criticism, or ignore petitions, by declaring that it was "not prepared to enter upon consideration of questions relating to the land and natives of New Guinea," since it had been forced to assume responsibility for a large part of the island. In addition, the report of one of its officers had declared very vigorously that the support of the missionaries had been indispensable to him. His phrase that "they had established such a hold over the natives as many a crowned head would be proud to possess,"¹ must have recalled unpleasant memories of the missionary kingdom of Tahiti; and must have made the Government more ready to keep the New Guinea missionaries quiet by listening to their complaints, and by encouraging them to think that the independence of a missionary kingdom was unnecessary for the protection of the natives. In this letter Lawes gave instances of some recent abuses in the traffic, and concluded thus:

"If the confidence of the people at the east end of New Guinea is not restored by the speedy return of their sons, husbands, and brothers, complications will ensue, and reprisals on innocent white men will take place. The British Government, whatever form it may take in New Guinea, will be discredited, and looked on with suspicion by those who believe they have been deceived, and their homes desolated, by the white man.

"All these alleged misdeeds have taken place at the extreme eastern end of New Guinea, but the report of them, with many additions, will travel all along the coast."

¹ PP. 1885, c. 4273, No. 134.

Lord Derby acted with surprising promptness, and forwarded a copy of the letter to the Governor of Queensland for the latter to take action upon it. Some recruiting agents were subsequently apprehended and sentenced to death and penal servitude, for "murder in kidnapping" and for kidnapping.¹ The commission which was appointed to make enquiries into the allegations of Lawes, recommended that all natives improperly recruited should be returned to their homes at public expense; and 405 were accordingly returned on June 13, 1885,² a number, Lawes wrote, "only 58 short of the whole number affected."³

But the most important achievement of the missionaries existed in the interpretation of the Proclamation of the Protectorate. In actual phrasing the address to the natives differed slightly at the various places where it was delivered, but in every case this promise was made to the natives on behalf of the White Queen: "No one will be allowed to take you against your wishes from your homes."⁴

This was the very definite interpretation placed upon the written proclamation⁵ by the missionary interpreters with the sanction, and on behalf of the officer proclaiming the Protectorate, and it proved eventually to be the death sentence passed upon the labour traffic in New Guinea;

¹ PP. 1885, 4273, Nos. 63, 67.

² PP. 1885, c. 4584, Nos. 93, 125.

³ *The Times*, September 23, 1885.

⁴ Quoted from the address to the chiefs at Toulon Island, November 14, 1884. (PP. 1885, c. 4273.)

⁵ The preamble read: "Whereas it has become essential for the protection of the lives and properties of the native inhabitants of New Guinea . . . that a British Protectorate should be established over a certain portion of such country and islands. . . ." (*Handbook of the Territory of Papua*, compiled by the Hon. Staniforth Smith, 3rd Ed., 1912, p. 101.)

for the proclamation was ever afterwards quoted by the missionaries, and by those who took a similar view of policy, as a solemn pledge which the Government could not repudiate without dishonour, and which it was eventually forced to confirm by legislative enactment.

Four years only were to pass before the British Government asserted its sovereignty over the Protectorate, but it was a long enough period to give proof beyond question that only the powers of complete sovereignty were sufficient to fulfil the promise given in 1884.

The Protectorate failed for the same reason that the High Commission for the Western Pacific failed—because of its limited jurisdiction. Romilly, whose report of 1887 that kidnapping was having an evil effect on the natives, has already been quoted,¹ complained bitterly in his private correspondence at that time, that he had no legal power to punish any natives, and indeed could be tried for murder if any native was shot by his orders.²

The position was pointed out clearly by Sir J. Garrick, Agent-General for Queensland, on January 11, 1887, at a meeting of the Colonial Institute in London.

"It is clear," he declared, "that matters cannot continue as they are." There was no remedy for a state of insecurity for life and property, except the declaration of British sovereignty in order to establish jurisdiction over both natives and foreigners, and provide an administra-

¹ See *ante*, p. 87.

² *Letters and Memoir*, 1893, pp. 297, 391. A memo. of the High Commissioner of February 26, 1881, read: "The jurisdiction of the High Commissioner extends over all British subjects in the Western Pacific, but over British subjects exclusively. He has no authority whatever to deal, whether judicially or in his executive capacity, with the offences of natives of islands not under dominion of the Crown." PP. 1883, c. 3814, p. 6.

tion which would secure imperial and Australian interests while adequately protecting native interests.¹

This speech was made in a debate following upon a paper read by Chalmers, which was probably the most eloquent and, without doubt, the most important address he ever gave. In it he outlined what ought to be the future administrative policy in New Guinea, and he took as the basis for it the pledge made to the natives a little over two years before. He was anxious, and emphatically urged that the straight path marked out by the proclamation should be followed; and he hoped that "we should never break faith with the native."

The Colonial Conference of 1887 provided an opportunity for British statesmen to review the whole question in council. They confirmed the sentence passed upon the labour trade with New Guinea three years before, and the pledge there given to the natives was incorporated in paragraph 10 of the Schedule for the proposed "British New Guinea (Queensland Act) of 1887," which read:

"No deportation of natives to be allowed either from one part of the Territory to another or to places beyond the Territory. . . ."²

Upon the Act receiving the royal assent, instructions were issued to the first Administrator of the Territory June 8, 1888, of which section 12 of paragraph 10 read:

"The Administrator shall not assent to any Ordinance providing for deportation of natives either from one part of the Possession to another or to places beyond the Possession."³

And Sir William Macgregor signed an Ordinance pro-

¹ *R.C.I.*, vol. xviii. p. 111.

² *Proceedings of the Colonial Conference.* PP. 1887, c. 5091.

³ *Handbook of Papua*, loc. cit., p. 108.

hibiting such deportation immediately upon taking up his appointment.¹

Perhaps a word might be said in defence of this legislation. The bad effect of the labour trade upon the relations of the white man with the native has already been sufficiently emphasized.

It must also be remembered that native labour procured under such conditions was never satisfactory or of a long life, for the savage, enslaved and miserable in a strange country, and usually under cruel masters, soon fell ill and died from depression.²

On the other hand the Papuan was found to show "considerable intelligence," and to be an "excellent worker" in his accustomed surroundings under good employers. The Labour Ordinance therefore gave those in industry in Papua "the advantage of being able to draw their labour supply from the natives of the territory, thus obviating the heavy expenses of importing coolie labour."³

¹ Ordinance III. of 1888.

² In answer to a question how one of them liked plantation life, during the inquiry conducted by Commodore Erskine, a native replied, "When in our own land, work well, but on plantation, all cry, work bad, eat nothing, only food in morning, work, work, all day, in evening too tired to eat pannikin of rice." PP. 1885, c. 4273, p. 108.

³ *Handbook of the Territory of Papua*, loc. cit., p. 84, 85.

CHAPTER V

“ NEW GUINEA FOR THE NEW GUINEANS ”

THE British Government of the time has been much criticized because of its opposition to the further extension of the Empire in the Pacific. But although it is difficult, even impossible, to defend the attitude of the British Colonial Office, in refusing to take responsibility for the islands adjacent to Australia and New Zealand until it was forced to do so by the indignation aroused in the Colonies by foreign annexations, and by the disorder in Pacific waters, their attitude to unofficial enterprise is justifiable.

Both in New Zealand and in Fiji much trouble was stored up for the Government by the short-sighted commercial policy of a colonization company, and so its opposition to the plans of any company formed to colonize New Guinea was not unreasonable.

As far as missionary influence affected the question it strengthened the Government in their attitude, and missionaries also warned them of attempts to flout their policy.

In 1875 a deputation of the Anti-Slavery Society waited upon Lord Carnarvon to request him to oppose the project of the Australasian Colonization Company, which was organizing an expedition to New Guinea. Rev. A. W. Murray of New Guinea and Dr Mullens, Foreign Secretary of the London Missionary Society, were members of the deputation.¹

¹ November 17, 1875. PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 62.

In 1878 Acting-High Commissioner Gorrie pointed out to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach the objectionable nature of the scheme. The Company proposed to claim 60,000 acres for plantation and 50,000 more if gold was not discovered, and for the protection of its servants, five swivel cannon were to be taken, also a supply of small arms and ammunition, and a circular fort of boiler plate, $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch thick, pierced for rifles.¹

It is not surprising to find that Sir M. Hicks-Beach approved of the reply of the High Commissioner to the Company on July 17, 1878, declaring that he would "make use of his powers to oppose . . . any enterprise calculated to compromise the Imperial Government, or likely to produce collisions with the native inhabitants of New Guinea, which might seriously embarrass the future relations of British subjects in that region."²

A few years later Lord Derby refused permission to Brigadier-General H. R. Maciver to proceed with a New Guinea Trading Corporation, which had much the same views of colonization methods as the earlier company, in spite of the protestations of its officers.³

The characteristic common to all such enterprises was the determination to buy land from the natives. Where the natives were unable to understand a selling contract of land, and the colonizers had no other aim beyond the selfish one of financial interest, it was not unreasonable of the Government to fear the result, or unwise of it to refuse to countenance any such attempts at settlement.

It is doubtful, though, whether the chief danger to the future dependency came so much from colonization

¹ August 19, 1878. PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 53.

² PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 47.

³ November 1883. PP. 1884, c. 3863.

companies as from individuals. So much preparation and advertisement was required in order to finance an expedition, that the Government could not fail to hear of any organized attempt to colonize the country. Indeed it was unlikely that any such attempt would be made without Government permission. Shareholders would be rendered anxious by the refusal of the High Commissioner to protect the companies' servants, should they be attacked by the natives, and they would be unlikely to run the risk of his disapproval growing to armed opposition, as Sir A. Gordon seemed to threaten.

But a single enterprising individual, although running graver personal risk, might escape exposure, and, his dealings being on a much smaller scale, he might even chance to have his claims confirmed.

Native discontent, however, can quickly grow from a small seed. Both in its possible ultimate effect upon native relations, and in its power as a dangerous precedent, the sale of land to an individual was as much to be feared as the sale of land to a colonizing company.

The first attempt of an individual in New Guinea to buy land as a speculation was also the last. For Chalmers and Lawes acted promptly in directing the attention of the Government to the fact, and to the dangers involved.

Shortly after Chester had annexed South-Eastern New Guinea to Queensland, a trader named Goldie, who had been successful in maintaining friendship with the natives, bought nominally on behalf of a Sydney syndicate, about 15,000 acres of sugar land. The various accounts of the transaction differ in the details, but it appears that Goldie and a surveyor named Cameron were offered by a native of the Kabadi tribe, Paru, this land which in reality belonged to the chief, Urevado. Lawes was

apparently persuaded to make out a deed in Motu language,¹ which was translated then by a native teacher into Kabadi. The price paid for the land according to Cameron was the equivalent of £140 (which, he protested, was more than he had ever paid for land in Fiji for sugar or cotton growing).²

On October 17, 1883, Baron Maclay drew the attention of the Colonial Office to a telegram from Chalmers to the Colonial Secretary, reporting the transaction. On December 3, Lord Derby telegraphed to the Governor of New South Wales for information. The latter confirmed the news, and said that the forthcoming Convention would probably deal with such cases. On December 11, G. Palmer, M.P., a member of the Aborigines Protection Society, forwarded a letter from Lawes, "a most trustworthy man," to the Colonial Office.³

Lawes asserted that only about £10 worth of trade was given for the land, and quotes the speculators' own statement that they only gave £70 worth. "They have now gone along the coast to make other purchases in the same way," he continued. "We feel sure that if the facts of the case are laid before Her Majesty's advisers, they will never sanction the wholesale transfer of native lands, especially when it carries with it no responsibility with regard to the future of the true owners of the land." If the Government did not refuse to recognize "any purchase of land from natives by private individuals . . . collision with the natives is inevitable,

¹ This is strange in view of the opposition of Lawes afterwards.

² *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 23, 1883, quoted in PP. 1884, c. 3863. Cameron asserts that the acreage was: sugar, 1000; cotton, 2000; and some swamp. Chalmers says that the price was 1d. per acre, *i.e.* half the figure Cameron gives.

³ PP. 1884, c. 3863.

and British interests will be damaged for the aggrandizement of a few land grabbers and sugar planters. The evil that must ensue to the natives is self-evident. A large influx of foreigners, for whose good behaviour no one would be responsible, and who would be under no restraint but self-interest, could only result in cruelty, wrong, and injustice. The natives would soon be cleared off the land."

"Whatever the relations between the British Government and New Guinea may be, it is of the first importance that the land of the natives should not be at the mercy of white men 'making haste to be rich.' If there is to be any transfer of native land, it should only be through the representative of a responsible Government. Only thus can anything like justice be secured between barbarous and civilized races. . . ."

He declared that it was the interests of the natives generally that had to be considered, and continued:

"Every district, such as that of Kabadi, supplies a large outside population with food in return for pottery and other articles of trade. The alienation of any large tract of country would cut off the food supply of neighbouring places, close a large market, and stop useful native industries. These are responsibilities which none but a representative of a civilized Government can assume, and no other can protect native interests."

To this letter and enclosure the Colonial Office replied on December 17, sending a copy of their reply to Acting-High Commissioner Gorrie, saying that if the facts were as stated "as they appeared to be," H.M. Government would "certainly refuse to recognize this transaction or any other of a similar character," and noted with pleasure that the Australian Convention would support them.

Confirmation of the story, and additional emphasis upon the important principle of policy involved in it came from Sir H. H. Palmer, Administrator of Queensland, who wrote to Lord Derby, under date October 24, as follows :

"It is hardly necessary for me to point out to your Lordship the very serious difficulties which are likely to arise, if speculative Europeans are permitted to trade upon the ignorance and simplicity of the natives of New Guinea. . . . It is highly undesirable that the troubles experienced in New Zealand and Fiji should be repeated in the case of New Guinea." He concluded by arguing that "British rule in some form or other would have to be established." Sir H. Palmer's attention had been drawn to the transaction by a letter from Chalmers to the Colonial Secretary, and by a report in the *Brisbane Courier*. Both the letter and the newspaper cutting he enclosed to Lord Derby in order to give greater support to his view.

Chalmers's letter to Sir Thomas McIlwraith is dated September 24. It is worth quoting almost in full.

"My dear Sir Thomas," he writes, "remembering your request, that if we had anything to report we should do so direct to the Colonial Secretary, who would attend to the same, I therefore beg to draw your attention to the following sale of land at Kabadi, off Redscar Bay, one of the finest districts in New Guinea."¹

After describing the circumstances of the sale, he pointed out that apart from the illegality of it, the system of buying land from the natives was bad, and would lead to serious trouble in the future. No native thought

¹ It seems probable that this request was made at the interview which Chalmers had with Sir T. McIlwraith in Brisbane earlier in the year, already referred to, *ante*, p. 90.

that he was parting with his land for ever, nor did he imagine that any other one would come on to it but he who had paid the tomahawk, or that on his leaving or dying the land would not revert to its original owner.

"These natives are like children," Chalmers asserted, "the glitter of the new tomahawk will draw from them their best and only real treasure—their land."

Land sales now would be harmful later, for instead of a responsible government to care for ousted natives there would be selfish capitalists, who would care nothing for the natives.

He corroborated Lawes as to the economic importance of the land claimed and continued :

"The present purchasers think it is a missionary dodge, and that we are merely through spleen, or something else, opposing them, but I assure you, my dear Sir Thomas, it is nothing of the kind ; it is not merely because we are missionaries that we are determined to use all our influence to upset this land scheme, but because we as men feel it to be an unjust act to the ignorant natives and an injustice to any government that may come hereafter. Why begin now in New Guinea what has caused so much trouble in New Zealand, Fiji, and Samoa ? Let it be distinctly understood that no native can sell land, but through a Government officer, and no land sales made in any other way will be recognized, and this land lifting will be stopped."

There is not space to quote the article from the *Brisbane Courier*,¹ but it is interesting for the marks it bears of having been, if not written, at least inspired by Chalmers. Many phrases in the private letter occur almost word for word in the article. It was about this time that he was a correspondent for a leading colonial

¹ October 20, 1883.

newspaper,¹ but although he may have written most of this particular article, he can hardly have been responsible for it, since it contains a vivid description of "the Tyrant missionary . . . who would not be kept back from asserting native rights." The fact that Sir H. Palmer relies upon the historical argument of Chalmers may not unfairly be taken as an indication of the impression which Chalmers was able to make upon Administrators by the forcible expression of his views.²

Soon after this, Theodore Bevan attempted to obtain permission to form a Trading Company on the lines of the North Borneo Company. One gathers that his first interview with Sir Peter Scratchley was not entirely unsuccessful. At least he did not receive a direct negative, and was given a permit "to explore and trade." But he says that the Special Commissioner's attitude underwent a change, and became "cold and stiff towards him." This he ascribes to the influence of Chalmers and Lawes, especially the former. He alleges that he had a stormy interview with Chalmers, who lost his temper, reproached him for his attitude to the missionaries, and threatened that he would tell General Scratchley to send him back to Cooktown. This interview, he adds, was followed by a warning from Scratchley not to write against the missionaries. He never received permission to form his Company from Scratchley, and after the latter's death received from his successor a definite refusal.³

¹ Chalmers writes of this on April 4, 1884, but does not divulge the name of the newspaper. (*Autobiography*, p. 226.)

² PP. 1884, c. 3863.

³ Bevan, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15, 107, 135, 136, 153, 175. Bevan's version is probably true. Chalmers suggests that his wife complained of his lack of calmness. "Another day she said to me, 'You know, Tamate dear, you are always in such a hurry, you make people feel very uncomfortable. Now at your time of life try and take things a little easier, and all your

Thus it is not surprising that Bevan formed a hostile opinion of the Protectorate administration, declaring that neither Scratchley nor Douglas assisted him, but rather thwarted him.¹ However, it was perhaps fortunate that they did. Bevan's view of his own importance, combined with his lack of sympathy for the natives, suggest that his company would hardly have made things easier for the Administrator.²

Fortunately, too, the first Administrator who succeeded Hon. J. Douglas had very strong views upon the native question, and though Bevan received from him a polite answer to his request for land, it was non-committal.³ Sir William Macgregor was, however, very far from non-committal in Ordinances, and in his views set forth in his first report, and in the official publication upon British New Guinea.

"It may be stated briefly," he declared in the report, "that so far, no district has been found in the Possession in which any plan for the settlement of Europeans could be carried out. This was owing to the good lands on high and drier ground being occupied by the natives."⁴

And in the *Handbook* he wrote, two years later "... the Government will not, and cannot deprive any native of his land. This policy has been deliberately

friends will feel more comfortable." Chalmers's *Autobiography*, p. 462. And in 1883 Chalmers wrote, "I have become sort of savage . . . very unsociable I am told," p. 242.

¹ Bevan. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

² The Special Commissioner, in referring to an application for land from Bevan in 1888, writes, "that he thought his estimate of 254,000 acres as a return for his discoveries much beyond what . . . would be an equivalent for the discoveries made by that gentleman." (PP. 1889, c. 5620-3.) "The shiftless aboriginal" must learn "to bend his back to the yoke of Adam's curse or make room for those who will." Bevan, p. 276.

³ Bevan. *Ibid.*, pp. 269, 271.

⁴ Queensland, PP. c.c. 105-1890.

adopted by the three contributing colonies and sanctioned by the Imperial Government. The great majority of the natives are agriculturalists, and live on the produce of their lands, which are handed down from parent to child and from one relative to another." ¹

There was now a moderate area of land available (between three and four thousand acres), and the circumstances of the Possession had become such as to make it the duty of the Government to try to attract the working settler possessed of some capital. For the speculator in land the country offered no field; but land could be obtained for planting purposes.

Thus from the first the native of New Guinea has been protected from exploitation by the white adventurer, and here at least British statesmen have not made ill use of "one of the finest opportunities" ever offered them.

The immediate result of this policy was that an administration was established and maintained in the dependency "without a single soldier"; although an "experienced Australian Governor" had advised the Colonial Office "that as the expenditure on the Maori War had cost £12,000,000 the acquisition of Papua might cost as much." ²

The ultimate result cannot be estimated. Only we know that in the evolution of an Empire which owes the stability of its constitutional growth to a regard of its rulers for precedent, a precedent such as this for the disinterested administration of a native dependency cannot but be vital.

The part played by the missionaries in forming

¹ *Handbook of Information*, 1892.

² Sir W. Macgregor in the *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, May 1918, quoting Governor Sir G. F. Bowen in PP. 1876, c. 1566, p. 11.

this precedent is clear, as far as the period before the Protectorate is concerned. It was due to them that it was "a clean page"¹ upon which the lay statesmen started to write.

It is not so clear, as regards the later period. It is difficult to estimate how much the support, accorded by better formed public opinion to the principle enunciated by Chalmers,² was due to the personal influence of the latter, and to that of other missionaries.

In 1888 for instance the Chief Justice of Queensland at the Royal Colonial Institute spoke strongly against "the cession from the natives of a single inch of land." He would allow "no land-speculators to enter New Guinea at present," and he thought that "the Protectorate should be a strict protectorate."

He was supporting at this meeting the appeal of Powell to save New Guinea from "such a calamity as the landing of irresponsible adventurers would inflict."

It is impossible to estimate how far Sir Charles Lilley and others like him owed their opinion to Chalmers's vigorous advocacy. But it can be safely asserted that this vigorous advocacy by personal interview,³ by lectures,⁴ by articles in the press,⁵ and by published

¹ Sir Charles Lilley in 1888, at the R.C.I.

² *R.C.I.*, January 11, 1887, p. 106, "New Guinea for the New Guineans and the New Guineans for New Guinea."

³ *E.g.* November 11, 1886, Chalmers visited Sir R. Herbert "and went over New Guinea affairs." (*Autobiography*, p. 270.) Herbert at that time was Under-Secretary. See also *ante*, p. 101, and p. 90.

⁴ *E.g.* *R.C.I.*, January 11, 1887, see *ante*, pp. 60-62. June 5, 1887, a meeting at Inverary with the Duke of Argyll in the chair. In August 1887 to the R.G.S. of Australia in Adelaide. During August he attended many meetings, including one in Melbourne, at which Sir Henry and Lady Loch were present. (*Autobiography*, pp. 283, 289.)

⁵ *E.g.* *ante*, p. 103.

books¹ carried on not only by Chalmers but also by Lawes cannot have been fruitless. There is ample evidence of the power of their personality in the letters and journals of those who came in contact with them. It is not likely that the power they wielded was only effective in conversation.

Indeed if Chalmers's journal is to be believed—and there seems no reason to doubt its truth—the Government itself did not close its eyes to the value of Chalmers's opinion. On May 5 he writes that he saw the Earl of Onslow at Northampton who “only wanted me to know that the government of New Guinea would be very much on the lines of my books and papers,” but the real reason was to hint at a government position for him if he applied. Chalmers, however, was quite content to continue working through his personal influence, and with a touch of conceit he comments, “They would like me to apply. I will have them ask me for a negative.”²

Much, however, of the credit for the direction of British policy in New Guinea has been given, and no doubt rightly given, to Sir William Macgregor, who fulfilled the description given by Chalmers³ of the Administrator, “that the dependency would require a man . . . accustomed to deal with natives, a man of firmness and commonsense,

¹ E.g. *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, 1885. In the Introduction it is noted that the English press was deeply stirred at Germany's annexation of the Northern coast, but that the missionary enterprise on the Southern coast was hardly noticed. Chalmers forecasts the ultimate annexation by Great Britain, and suggests the line of policy. As New Guinea was of strategic rather than commercial value to Great Britain the Government should be for the native races not the white men. (This outline of policy was afterwards made the basis for his lecture before the R.C.I., 1887.)

² *Autobiography*, p. 271. The writer has attempted without success to corroborate this. But Chalmers's own evidence is sufficient.

³ *R.C.I.*, January 11, 1887, p. 105.

who will choose his own subordinates, and who can act independently of missionaries (*sic*) or beachmen, and who will not fear the attacks of small colonial papers. Your men of red-tape and wax, without real knowledge and stamina, are unfitted for the work, and an ounce of commonsense taught by native experience is worth more than tons of folios of reports, investigations, etc."

But although one can agree with Judge J. H. P. Murray that "it was to Sir W. Macgregor that we owe the fact that this humane and enlightened native policy became a recognized part of the Government programme,"¹ it is only fair to the missionaries to add that had it not been for them there might not have existed any such policy to be recognized.

Mr Fletcher goes so far as to suggest that Macgregor owed his views on the land question to his contact with Rev. Lorimer Fison in Fiji, declaring that in his pamphlet on Land Tenure in Fiji, Fison "started the policy which is affecting, or has already affected, British administration everywhere in the Pacific. This includes British New Guinea, now under Australian control, where Sir William Macgregor, ten years after Lorimer Fison's lecture was delivered at Levuka, laid down lines in dealing with the lands of the Possession which have not since been departed from." A few pages previously Mr Fletcher had declared that "the name which comes up in the Pacific as that of the scientific exponent of native needs and traditions is not his own (Sir W. Macgregor's) or Sir Arthur Gordon's but Lorimer Fison's."²

In addition to the necessity of protecting the native

¹ *Papua or British New Guinea*, Introduction, p. 81 (1912).

² *The New Pacific*. C. Brunston Fletcher, 1917, pp. 173, 146. Mr Fletcher's opinion was formed after examining the unpublished correspondence of Lorimer Fison (*ibid.*, p. 172).

from land speculators by prohibiting the sale of land, the Government of the Possession had also to protect both races from the apple, or rather in this case, the bottle, of discord which unscrupulous traders were only too ready to throw amongst them. But after the lesson of New Zealand no competent administrator was likely to prove laggard in legislating against the traffic in both liquor and firearms. And in any case it was expressly laid down in the British New Guinea Act of 1888 that "the Administrator shall not assent to any Ordinance providing for the supply of arms, ammunition, intoxicants, or opium to the natives."

The missionary influence in this case was upon public opinion in the days before the Protectorate, when the traffic was in full swing at many of the islands of the Pacific, and when it was necessary that attention should be drawn to the ensuing evils.

Owing to his experience of the drink traffic at Rarotonga, Chalmers went to New Guinea determined that if possible that country should be saved the troubles brought upon other islands such as Rarotonga by "drunken beach-combers" and "the miserable traders from Tahiti . . . who would sell their own souls to make a few dollars."

But although he was always active in defending his beloved natives from any menace of that kind,¹ neither he, nor the other missionaries who did the same, were unsupported in their fight by the laymen, including those holding responsible posts.² And one of the first

¹ *E.g.* In letter to Lord Derby, and in a letter to a fellow missionary to stand fast upon this question (*ante*, p. 88).

² *E.g.* La Meslee at the meeting in 1883, already referred to (see *ante*, pp. 46, 47), hoped that the Government would exercise control over the first settlers, especially with regard to the sale of firearms, liquor, etc.

Acting-High Commissioner Gorrie wrote to Sir M. Hicks-Beach,

Ordinances of Sir William Macgregor prohibited the supply of either firearms or liquor to the natives, and made it illegal for natives to have firearms in their possession, unless with special permission.¹

It would be more true, probably, to say that the administrators and the British Government were not unsupported by the missionaries in their measures against the liquor and arms traffic, and that this support was chiefly valuable in its effect upon public opinion.

October 14, 1878, agreeing with Chester upon the advisability of a penal law to deal with the liquor traffic. (PP. 1883, c. 3617, p. 87.)

¹ Ordinance No. 1 of 1888 (Q. PP. c., A. 13-1890). Permits for firearms for special purposes were issued to 78 non-Europeans during period September 1888-June 1889, of which 45 were to agents of the L.M.S. for procuring food.

CHAPTER VI

“ THE NEW GUINEANS FOR NEW GUINEA ”

To safeguard the rights of the native to his land, however, was by itself but a negative policy, which the enterprising white could have attacked with some justice. For it would have meant that the development of the dependency would have been much hindered. The natives both of Polynesia and of Melanesia were accustomed to produce only what was required for their own necessities, and had no ambition to develop their land beyond a point sufficient to satisfy these. In New Zealand the Maori became demoralized on becoming a landlord,¹ and in Fiji and in the Solomon Islands he is rapidly becoming so for the same reason. “ The native Fijian will not work,” writes Mr Fletcher. “ Why should he? A paternal government has secured him in the possession of his lands, and now he is able to draw a substantial income from them. . . . Naturally the natives feel independent in a country where food may be grown at a minimum of cost and labour, and where the sun is a continual source of profit for lazy folk who are

¹ The necessity of assisting the Maori to settle his own lands was never properly recognized (by legislation) “ and the spectacle was presented of a people starving in the midst of plenty.” (Report of Commission of 1907, quoted by Scholefield, *New Zealand in Evolution*, 1909, p. 341.)

The Treaty of Waitangi established a native landed aristocracy, and the Government, by preserving native rights without encouraging the natives to perform the duties of citizenship in helping to develop the country, put a premium on laziness and did the native race grave injury. (Scholefield, *ibid.*, p. 334.)

content to live on bananas, bread-fruit, yams, and young coco-nuts." ¹ Similarly the Solomon islander who has nuts in his possession has a bank account upon which he draws. He does not need to work, with the result that the planter who wishes to cultivate the coco-nut on a large scale finds it difficult to obtain labour. ²

The German solved the labour problem easily by using forced labour. At present, although there is not much written evidence about his treatment of the native, there is sufficient to establish the fact of the principle upon which the German developed his possessions, which was, simply, to dragoon the native, take his land, and put him under Prussian official discipline. The native was not considered to be a fellow creature, but was treated as a chattel. In the early days of German expansion there were probably some ugly blots upon its record, but in recent years, before the war, they became comparatively benevolent in their slave-driving, since it paid to keep their slaves alive and docile. ³

But for England the problem was more difficult, since she entered the Western Pacific partly to protect the native, and wanted the development of her Pacific possessions to follow lines consistent with that aim.

¹ Fletcher. *The New Pacific*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 197.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 160, 162, 168, 262, etc.

The mystery in which German methods in the Pacific are shrouded has been regretted by Mr Fletcher in his *Stevenson's Germany, the Case against Germany in the Pacific*. He, however, while admitting that he is forced to argue much from suggestion, asserts that "in Samoa itself Germans for nearly forty years were slave-owners and slave-drivers—in the sense that the natives employed by them were not free agents, neither at the moment of engagement nor in the manner of their employment . . . and right through the ocean German ways with the natives have been full of treachery, deceit, and devilishness. The German trade and labour ideal has been to make as much profit as possible without reference to law or gospel." (Published 1920, pp. 73, 74, etc.)

Unfortunately little progress was made in the ideal, owing to the form which the method took ; and, in protecting the native from the white man, the early administrators never realized that the native had also to be protected from himself. Thus in New Zealand and in Fiji there is a danger that the native races will die out from inertia. If that ever happens the epitaph upon their graves will be, " Here lie those who died as a result of the efforts of their well-meaning friends to save them."

It was only after a hundred years of British rule that the colonist of New Zealand awoke to the fact that the Maori race was dying out, because " the necessity of assisting the Maori to settle his own lands was never properly recognized," and that he could only be preserved by encouraging and training him to become an industrious citizen.¹

In contrast to this the first Governor of British New Guinea aimed at educating the native character under protection, so that the native could ultimately play a large part in the development of his country.

Here again there is a striking similarity between the views of Macgregor and Chalmers. For Chalmers, in his declaration at the Royal Colonial Institute, did not merely cry " New Guinea for the New Guineans," but also " The New Guineans for New Guinea." He realized that the last was the necessary complement of the first. There is justification for guessing that Chalmers drew the attention of Macgregor to this, for Macgregor only came to New Guinea in 1888, and as early as 1885 Chalmers's book had been published, in which he suggested that, in the event of British sovereignty being declared, the dependency should be governed through the native chiefs by officers, who were to superintend and encourage the natives to

¹ Scholefield, *loc cit.*, p. 341.

work plantations.¹ This suggestion Chalmers elaborated later in his speech at the Royal Colonial Institute, although, according to his biographer, most of the paper had been written in 1885.

"Teach our natives, encourage them in trade, and they will never want your charity," Chalmers assured those who were frightened of the expense. "Encourage the natives in raising produce suitable for the Australian markets," he continued, "education will soon cause a demand for imported produce. Give them that to cultivate which will enable them to meet their wants, and a market near at hand which will take all they grow." He advocated native-worked plantations under English officers governing through the native chiefs. "Traders would soon swarm, but no one should be allowed to trade with the natives directly but only through the Government. If coco-nuts were planted . . . a good trade in copra could be created." He cited as an example of the possibilities of this policy the Hula natives who were induced by an L.M.S. native teacher from Eastern Polynesia to make plantations which became a market for other tribes.²

¹ *Work and Adventure in New Guinea*, 1885, pp. 17, 18. *Autobiography*, pp. 255-257.

An undated note by Sir Peter Scratchley appears in his collected papers before an entry in his journal, dated August 1885. "The only hope of making New Guinea pay is by the employment of the natives. . . . New Guinea must be governed by the natives for the natives." (*Papers*, p. 302.) In view of the fact of Scratchley's dependence upon the missionaries for advice (see *post*, p. 120, and *Papers*, p. 315), this note bears out, by its similarity to Chalmers's text (above), the suggestion that Chalmers and not Macgregor was the originator of the policy of developing the country by the help of the inhabitants.

² *R.C.I.*, January 11, 1887, pp. 105, 106.

It is curious to notice that an initiative in regard to trade should come from the missionaries who have often been attacked for their alleged hostility to it, and that in one case at least it was the traders who

For the first few years of his administration Sir William Macgregor was content to establish law and order over the Possession, but in 1892 he started to carry out the policy outlined by Chalmers in 1885 and 1887. In that year he wrote in the *Official Handbook* that the Government "was sufficiently firmly established to protect settlers and to maintain law and order in the more accessible districts." "As tribes become more settled they have on their hands more leisure than was formerly the case. It was very desirable that this should be turned to some use ; that they and the European settlers should mutually benefit each other, the one by working with his hands for the other, while at the same time becoming acquainted with new products and new industries, the advantage of which he would learn from his employer."

Accordingly he made it "obligatory upon the natives in the coastal villages, and as far inland as the conditions would allow, to plant coco-nuts. Each man was to be responsible for his quota, and the trees he planted were to be native property." Mr Fletcher notices this Ordinance as an example of the imagination of Macgregor, but the records of the Royal Colonial Institute suggest that it was Chalmers and not Macgregor who "could see in his mind's eye a great stretch of coco-nut palms in native possession, providing stores of food against famine, ample nuts for the making of copra and the stimulation of trade, and in expanding revenue for the purposes of administration hampered the development of it. The Cavendish banana introduced into the Pacific by John Williams the missionary, which might be grown in large quantities in New Guinea, has had to compete with the Queensland banana grown largely by Chinese and protected by a heavy duty, and with the Fijian banana. The Australian "will pay sixpence a dozen for Fijian bananas, very often twice as much, yet here are bunches by the hundred thousand waiting his word if he will put his hand upon his own government." (*The New Pacific*, pp. 57, 58 252, 253.)

tion.”¹ Nevertheless it is to the credit of the Administrator that he had the imagination to see the vision of the missionary.

This Regulation, however, did not immediately take effect.

Sir George Le Hunte writes that “there was no means of enforcing it, and practically it was purely optional in the native to obey it or not. . . . It was left to the district magistrates to encourage the planting without trying to enforce it—they could only enforce it on those willing to obey.”²

Sir W. Macgregor also started Government plantations at the District Magistrate stations worked principally by prison labour, but these made little progress “owing to the limited revenue available to run them.”³

But immediately before the war the outlook was improving. In 1913 about 350,000 acres were under cultivation by the natives for their own use; with an average of one hundred trees per acre.⁴ And the following year Judge Murray, after drawing attention to the difficulties of enforcing the Regulation, reported that they were being overcome, and that the natives were generally being persuaded to obey it.⁵

It was of course hardly to be expected that the progress of the Possession would come up to the lofty ideal of the missionaries. Methods so constantly break down, even when the ideal is clearly seen; for methods depend upon the average man in the subordinate position, and although the artist may have a true inspiration, and from his imagination create a design for a noble building,

¹ *The New Pacific*, pp. 248, 249.

² See *post*, p. 123 (footnote 1).

³ *Official Handbook*, 1913, c. 4652, p. 38.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵ Report in 1914 (quoted in *The New Pacific*, pp. 250, 251).

it is not upon him, but upon the devotion and skill of minor architects and masons, that the right execution of the plan ultimately depends.

Lawes and Chalmers anxiously realized this, and were constantly striving to obtain keen labourers for their building. When plantation development was in danger at first, owing to the initial difficulty of obtaining sufficient estate managers with practical knowledge of Papuan labour,¹ Lawes addressed a letter to *The Times*.² Commenting upon Sir William Macgregor's report he emphasized the importance of laying a secure foundation for the future interest of the Possession upon respect for native rights, and went on to plead that as an inglorious warfare with the natives would call young Englishmen to arms, so much the more should they come forward for "the more peaceful and honourable vocation of building up a young nation, of developing the great human resources of this new possession." Officers would be needed as Government control extended, who would be capable of representing the Christian principle and the best of English life to the savages, and who, moved by "a nobler ambition than that of making money, would consecrate their energies and abilities to the work of civilizing, Christianizing, raising and ruling the nations of this great land."

Not content with the role of leaders, the missionaries helped by labouring themselves to train the native in industrial and agricultural pursuits. But although they were performing for the State the function of education, without cost to it,³ they treated it as part of the day's work, and there is as little reference to it in their journals and letters as there is to their work of preaching.

¹ *Official Handbook*, 1913, p. 36.

² August 11, 1890, quoted in *Biography*, J. King, p. 270.

³ Sir W. Macgregor. *British New Guinea*, etc., p. 92.

J. W. Lindt, however, who was lucky enough to see the launch of the eighteen-ton yacht *Mary*, from the Papuan industrial school at Murray Island, records the fact in his book, adding that the wood was cut and the building executed by pupils under the supervision of Rev. Samuel Macfarlane.¹ And various official reports testify frequently to the progress made by the native. In 1888 the Deputy-Commissioner for the Western Division reported that "many of the men are now willing workers in the bêche-de-mer fisheries." And the same year, another Deputy-Commissioner, in emphasizing the importance of Papuan labour, wrote, ". . . copra, gum, and bêche-de-mer exported from the British New Guinea coast is all collected by natives, and the two latter articles are cured and bagged without supervision once the collector has been shown the process." He added that the natives had "rendered useful and willing aid to traders and visitors in many ways, such as boatmen and woodcutters."²

Steady progress was thus made, and it is not surprising to see in the *Official Handbook* of 1913 a photograph of a native driving a plough tractor.³

There is much material not yet available which would help in determining beyond all doubt the decisive effect of missionary influence in the development of British New Guinea, and it is to be hoped that the full evidence of the late Sir William Macgregor may one day be published. For the time being we must be content with the indicating straws strewn over reports and journals, which themselves are fortunately almost conclusive.

It must be remembered that the Administrators lived

¹ *Picturesque New Guinea*, 1887, p. 4.

² PP. 1889, c. 5620-3, p. 50.

³ *Official Handbook*, 1913, p. 32a.

in close personal touch with the missionaries, who were not narrow-minded, nor were they timid in expressing their opinions, having a clear vision of the goal for which they aimed, and overflowing with the "energy, earnestness, and experience"¹ necessary to lead others to it. And the Administrators and missionaries were bound together by those strong ties of sympathy which are forged in the furnace of common dangers and anxieties.

With no other knowledge than this, one might hazard a guess that the missionary influence would be decisive, wherever active co-operation existed between missionaries and Administrators.

But it is just upon the question of co-operation that the straws of evidence available all point in the same direction. In the narrative of the daily work of administration, the names of the missionaries constantly recur. They were invaluable guides for journeys into the interior. Their advice was asked upon the relative value of different sites. Their stations formed the only link of communication in a territory which was about eight hundred miles in length; and they themselves and their teachers were often the only source of information. In translating the Bible into native languages, they compiled much valuable information about them; and owing to the expert knowledge thus acquired, they were the best qualified for the post of official interpreter. As Sir William Macgregor declared: "it practically amounts to this, that they are indispensable. It is not known to me that any officer that was responsible for the well-being and development of a primitive race ever entertained any other opinion."²

Because of the value of their help in purely admini-

¹ Sir W. Macgregor.

² *British New Guinea, Country and People*, 1897, p. 92.

strative work, and owing to their close friendship with the Government officers, it was inevitable that their opinion would also be sought upon executive problems.

For instance, at the request of Sir Peter Scratchley, Lawes wrote a memorandum upon *The Future Relations of the Natives and the White Race*, which put clearly before him the two alternative policies, advocated by the missionaries and the traders respectively, "to utilize, encourage, and strengthen all that is good and capable of improvement in native life and habit," or "to put the natives on one side, and try to develop the resources of the country according to our own ideas without dependence upon the natives at all." The first would be slow but promising, and he saw no reason why British rule should not become in New Guinea a benefit to both the native and the alien race. The second might produce results more quickly, but these were unlikely to be permanent owing to the climate and character of the country.¹

Presumably Sir Peter Scratchley was including this memorandum in his reference when he wrote to Lord Derby that in considering his plans for arriving at and organizing the Protectorate he had received "valuable and ready assistance from W. G. Lawes."²

Again, the private secretary of Sir William Macgregor, who watched the co-operation between his chief and James Chalmers, was emphatic in asserting both its existence and the value of it, when he had occasion to lecture.

¹ *Biography*. J. King, pp. 244-247. Compare Bacon "Planting of countries is like planting of Woods; for you must make account, to loose almost Twenty yeeres Profit and expect your Recompence, in the end. For the Principall Thing, that hath beene the Destruction of most Plantations, hath beene the Base, and Hastie drawing of Profit, in the first yeeres."

² PP. 1885, c. 4584, p. 95.

"The aims of the missionary bodies are almost identical with many of those of the Government, and thus they work hand in hand, each helping each, unity giving greater speed to progress," so that he was hopeful of the future of the Papuan.¹

Sir William Macgregor unfortunately has passed, but not before he had given many thankful tributes to the aid and counsel of missionaries. But history must regret that it was before he could give to them the permanent form they deserve, with a fuller narrative than has yet been written.²

It is therefore all the more worth recording the words of Sir George Le Hunte, a living witness to the work of the missionaries, and to the nature of co-operation which existed between them and his predecessor.

"In New Guinea, as in several other parts of the Pacific," he writes, "the missionaries were the pioneers of British administration," and he points out "that it was fortunate for them and for the natives that the first British Administrator was a man of great power, ability, experience, and foresight, the late Sir William Macgregor, who had many years intimate knowledge of the work of the missions in Fiji, and its value to the Government—and those who followed him, followed also the broad and wise lines laid down by their great predecessor."

"It was a far-seeing step that by mutual agreement between him and the heads of the several missions they confined their activities to the separate divisions of the possession where they had established themselves, and friction and confusion, especially in the minds of the

¹ T. H. Halton-Richards, *R.C.I.*, 1892-93, vol. xxiv., p. 299.

² "I could tell you a great deal of what has been done by . . . the missionary societies in the Pacific," R.G.S., February 22, 1915.

natives, were thus avoided. This wise arrangement has been loyally adhered to by the societies, and has facilitated both their work and that of the Government."

"The missions and the Government may be said to work hand in hand, and such were the foundations laid down by the great pioneers of both sides that the workers who followed them have been able to carry on the building uninterruptedly, by mutual effort, and with ever-increasing stability.

"The Government, which is responsible for the laws it makes, and for seeing them observed, is, through its officers, in close touch with the missionaries. In some cases the missions have established themselves first, and the Government has gladly availed itself of their work. In others, where the Government has entered new ground, it is quickly followed by the mission; and so, step by step, sometimes one and sometimes the other leading, the work goes on and religion, law, order, and civilization are in their several degrees making progress, and with wonderful results, as those who have been privileged to take a part in it can truthfully testify."

"The missionary societies keep a watchful eye upon the interests of the native and are prompt to offer advice, sometimes a protest, to the Government in matters of legislative or executive action which they may consider to be either advantageous or detrimental to those interests. They are sure of a sympathetic hearing and careful consideration."

"Nor are the interest of the white community disregarded. Much has been effected by the mission's influence both with the Government and the whites. The latter, though often not seeing eye to eye with the missionary, respect him, and recognize, though they may not admit it sometimes, that he is a force for peace

and good order, as well as for religion, and in the main support him."

"The result of this threefold co-operation has been the substantial progress of church, state, and commercial enterprise in this vast territory."¹

The matter might rest there, decided by the opinion of one who had personal experience in administering the dependency, but it is impossible to conclude a sketch of the history of missionary influence in New Guinea upon any other note than one of gratitude to an individual missionary.

Because the missionaries of New Guinea whose names have appeared in this essay have but recently passed from their field of action, and because the events which they faced and moulded occurred so short a time ago that they hardly deserve to be treated as history, it is not possible to retain anything but a blurred impression of their significance as individuals. But although they stand too close to be in focus, there is one amongst them, James Chalmers, whose figure dominates them.

There is a striking portrait of him in Mr Lindt's book.² Between Macfarlane of the genial smile and Lawes the scholar, in truth, in the words of Stevenson "he represents the essential." His eyes, full open under bold somewhat bushy brows, gaze commandingly at the reader, so that at the first glance he may not notice the jolly twinkle lurking within one of them, or the whimsical upward curve of the right eyebrow, as if it had caught something of the unexpectedness which remained in its owner's character from the days when he

¹ The writer is indebted to Sir George Le Hunte, G.C.M.G., who succeeded Sir William Macgregor in 1898, and was Governor of the Territory until 1903, for this note from the records of his personal experience.

² *Loc. cit.* To face p. 6.

played practical jokes on his fellow students at Cheshunt College. Yet the face, under careful scrutiny, never loses the force of the first impression it gave, belonging to one who laughs and jokes from his strength, and not from his weakness. The masterful poise of the head, the hair brushed back over the ears with characteristic decision, the determined lines upon the face, tell at once that this man is the leader of the three.

While Lawes was "the plodding translator and teacher," whose "great aim was to provide as early as possible a translation of the whole Gospel message," Chalmers was "the restless pioneer with a roving temperament, wedded to a crusader's faith." So that their meeting, as Lawes's biographer describes, was that of "two streams which were complementary."¹

But it was Lawes, rather than Chalmers, who was the tributary joining the main current. For missionary policy, which became later the policy of the Government, was moulded by Chalmers, and its ideal was diffused and its method practised more successfully by him, who as its creator was strangely enough also its ablest exponent.

While the natives knew *TAMATE* as their Chief and Peacemaker, — the missionaries, administrators, and officials all drew from his radiant personality, inspiration, energy, and wisdom. Although he had faults like other men—Bevan apparently had a taste of his violent temper—he was "that rarest man of all, the man whose ideal and method are neither opposed to nor separated from each other"; and posterity may well delight to inscribe high upon the roll of colonial statesmen the name of James Chalmers as one who embodied all that is finest in the missionary spirit, and all that is noble in the motive of British Imperialism.

¹ *Biography*. J. King, *loc. cit.*, p. 112.

PART III

CONCLUSION

IN an essay dealing with the influence of the missionaries upon British expansion, more emphasis perhaps might have been laid upon how much they stimulated it. But it is very probable that even if the missionaries had not opened up the Pacific, traders would undoubtedly have done so, not many years later than the date when the process did in fact begin.

Had that happened it can easily be guessed of what nature that expansion would have been, and it is not impossible that, in the absence of the humanitarian influence of the British missionaries, the history of the Pacific might have borne a dreadful similarity to the history of Spanish expansion in Mexico and Peru.

The true importance of missionary influence lies, then, not in the fact that, in part, the missionaries were the cause of the expansion, but in the character which they gave to it.

This is brought vividly into relief by placing the motives and record of British expansion in the nineteenth century against the background of the tendencies of the previous centuries. But if the same method is applied to the history of German or French expansion a similarity instead of a contrast is noticed, and it becomes clear beyond denial that the distinctive contribution of the British missionaries was that of a new principle to colonial statesmanship.

French expansion during the nineteenth century, although in method it marked an advance upon Spanish-Catholic expansion of the sixteenth century by the absence of persecution, belonged to that period in its ideals ; and the chief characteristic of French policy was the political value attached to the enterprise of French missionaries. It may be true that the first cause of French expansion was a religious reaction by the Catholics to the report of Protestant success in Tahiti,¹ but the French Government was not laggard in taking advantage of the religious enthusiasm of its subjects, and had no intention of adopting the attitude of the British Colonial Office, which held firmly to the view that " the hope of a conversion of a people to Christianity, however specious, must not be made a reason for increasing the British dominions." ²

Bishop Patteson experienced the political force behind the Catholic missionaries in 1858, when he met Père Montrouzier in conference about their respective policies and spheres of influence in the Loyalty Islands, where the French Bishop of New Caledonia had placed some priests early in that year. Patteson knew at once that he and the natives were both in the Frenchman's power, and Montrouzier knew it too. " He let me see," Patteson wrote, " that he knew he could force upon the Lifu people whatever he pleased, the French Government having promised him any number of soldiers he may send for, to

¹ " Pour remonter aux origines de l'action catholique en Océanie, il suffit de rappeler le rapport adressé en 1824, par Duperrey au ministre de la marine. Cet éloge, sans restrictions, des missions protestantes, eut en France un grand retentissement. Des polémiques de presse eurent pour effet de créer un mouvement d'opinion dans le parti catholique, qui résolut de prendre sa revanche à bref délai." (*L'Expansion Française dans le Pacifique Sud*. Soulier-Valbert, 1911, pp. 96, 80.)

² PP. 1862, No. 2995 (quoted by G. H. Scholefield *The Pacific, Its Past and Future*, p. 79).

take possession, if necessary, of the island. They have one thousand men in New Caledonia, steamers and frigates of war ; and he told me plainly that this island and Nengone are considered as natural appendages of New Caledonia, and practically French possessions already, so that, of course, to attempt doing more than secure for the people a religious liberty is out of the question. He promised me that if the people behaved properly to him and his people, he would not send for the soldiers, nor would he do anything to interfere with the existing state of the island . . . but that if necessary he would use force to establish the missionaries in houses in different parts of the island, if the chiefs refused to sell them parcels of land, for instance, one acre." ¹

The French policy was thus something of an anachronism in the nineteenth century, and although Sterndale's judgment is possibly too severe, there is a good deal of truth in the summary he gives of the results of that policy.²

"French colonization in Oceania," he wrote, ". . . does not appear to have produced any useful result. . . . The whole may be summed up in a few words : ' Casernes, conciergerie, bureau maritime, mission, café, salon de billiard, voila tout.' The result is indolence, demoralization, stagnation." And to this he adds a violent critical description too long to quote.³

The German ideal also belonged to the past, and their methods showed less advance than the French, being more brutal. Theirs was the irreligious commercial ideal of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the

¹ *Life of J. C. Patteson*. Charlotte Yonge, 1874, vol. i. pp. 368-69.

² *Sterndale Report*, *loc. cit.*, A. 3b., p. 18.

³ Compare *Dilke*, vol. ii., pp. 186, 187, who quoted Julian Thomas (a pro-French witness) that in New Caledonia the French had shown utter disregard of native rights and property.

German Government was not shy of owning to it, as the records of negotiations with it prove.

Thus under date August 9, 1884, Lord Granville writes to the Foreign Office that the German Ambassador "wished to take steps to protect more efficiently those islands and those parts of islands in the South Sea Archipelago, where German trade is largely developed and is daily increasing."¹ And Bismarck in conversation with Meade declared that "his system was to follow trade, not to precede it . . . and he had generally replied to a request for protection that, where German trade was established in a place where there is no foreign jurisdiction he would afford support."²

Some evidence of what he was supporting has already been quoted, and there is an elaborate analysis of the nature of the policy of both the supported and the supporter in the books of Mr Fletcher.³ The immediate evils resulting were recognized at once by those who held different views from the German Government of national responsibility to the native races. But later, the German Government itself was forced to recognize that Nemesis awaits those who solve political problems in the counting-house.

In the German Official Report⁴ upon German colonies for 1903-4, it is admitted that, for that period the report of the Colonial Department "does not give a very satisfactory account of the relations between the German authorities and the natives of New Guinea and the neighbouring islands," and it instances the forced withdrawal of the outlying stations at Hansa Bay, Kaiser

¹ PP. 1885, c. 4273.

² PP. 1885, c. 4290.

³ *Stevenson's Germany and The New Pacific*.

⁴ *Consular Reports (C.O.)*, No. 3519, cd. 2682-44, pp. 44-50; ditto, pp. 7, 8.

Wilhelmsland, "owing to the threatening attitude of the inhabitants." As a result, the account given of the economic development of German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago was "not very promising," the production of copra by the natives having decreased both in Samoa and in New Guinea, and the production of trepang and tortoiseshell having decreased nearly fifty per cent. as compared with the previous year.

So bad was the position reached by the pursuit of selfish interests that it was thought necessary to own that "the need of changes in the method of administration of the German colonies is generally acknowledged," and reforms taken from the British model were introduced.

Where France failed by treating her missionaries as political agents, Germany failed owing to her neglect of them, indeed owing to her active opposition to them. The orders of Godeffroy, whom Bismarck thought worthy of support, were quite definite upon that point. "Give no assistance to missionaries either by word or deed (beyond what is demanded of you by common humanity), but wheresoever you may find them, use your best influence with the natives to obstruct and exclude them"—thus Sterndale, once their employee, quotes their manager. And he adds an explanation of this opposition. "Throughout the Pacific for the past twenty-five years there has been a constant struggle for the mastery between missionaries and merchants, each being intensely jealous of the influence over native affairs obtained by the other. Merchants make the greatest profits out of savages, for the reason that savages are content to sell their produce for blue beads, tomahawks, and tobacco. When these savages are brought under the influence of the missionaries they are instructed to demand payment in piece goods wherewith to clothe themselves, and in coin for

the purpose of subscribing to the funds of the missionary societies. This reduces the profits of the merchants, who bitterly resent such interference."¹

That is the kernel of the matter—"the constant struggle for the mastery between missionaries and merchants." It was the fight between the new ideal of the nineteenth century, and the old worn-out motive of the eighteenth. And upon the issue of that fight depended not only the future of the Pacific, but also the resurrection of the political life of Western civilization.²

It should always remain a source of pride to the British, that it was the missionaries of their nation by whom that fight was won.³ In the thoughts of those statesmen—the title is fitting, for they were Empire builders, although they built on strangely new foundations—the

¹ *Sterndale Report, loc. cit.*

² Compare Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.

"To those colonies and territories . . . which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization."

³ Unfortunately it appears possible that the successors of Chalmers and Macgregor may find themselves engaged in a struggle against selfish interests even more severe than that in which those two Christian Imperialists fought with success. For it is certain that unless Christianity can be infused into the economic development of the twentieth century, as it was carried into the political development of the nineteenth by Williams and Marsden, and Fison and Chalmers, the building whose foundations these missionaries so securely laid will never be completed.

It is not impossible that the increasing control of policy by the international financier may be exercised in the direction of exploiting the Pacific in his interest, and that the twentieth century will see a struggle not merely in the Pacific, but all over the world, not against "the merchants" but against the financier—an unseen and therefore a more dangerous foe. (Two very suggestive books, *Economic Democracy* and *Credit Power and Democracy*, by Mr C. H. Douglas, have recently been published by Cecil Palmer upon this subject.)

nation to-day can find the encouragement and inspiration of a noble vision. Although the missionary societies had primarily "to provide against an irreligious colonization, against the importation of the vices of a more cultured race without the antidote that shall sweeten and counteract the inevitable tendencies of civilization,"¹ yet the leaders were always ready to remind the British people of "the proud and enviable position which God had given to Great Britain amongst the nations, and of the opportunities thereby offered to it."² They did not oppose colonization, but rather advocated it so long as it was "consistent with wisdom and justice and conformable with the precepts of that religion which Britain, as a nation, professes," teaching that it "must unite the building up of new states with the confirmation and prosperity of one already built."³

Those who do not accept the faith they preached must yet acknowledge the worth of their ideal; while British Christians will wonder joyfully at the manner in which the efforts of the missionaries vindicated the teaching of the Gospel, that a nation has but to "seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness," and dominion and wealth will in good time be added to it.

It is true that in the history of that period there were many mistakes made by individual missionaries, and much neglect of opportunities by the Government at home, and that the remedies for the evils of the time were slow in coming, and not immediately effective when they came. It is true indeed that the practical application of the

¹ Rev. F. Pigou at St James, Piccadilly, Easter, 1877.

² *Ibid.* (see British Museum Library, G. A. Selwyn, 4462a, 5, 1877).

³ *On the British Colonization of New Zealand*, by the Committee of the Aborigines Protection Society, 1846, p. 39. (Of the members of the Committee of the A.P.S. in 1846 at least one—Rev. John Burnet—was also a Director of the L.M.S.)

missionary ideal failed in the early days because it was premature, and for the same reason, perhaps, the nation awoke but slowly to an understanding of the tradition the missionaries were building up, so that only at the close of the century did British administration conform radically in its methods to their ideals.

But idealism only remains idealism and retains its distinctive value so long as it is impracticable, and although the practical application of the missionary principle was premature, the worth of the principle itself remains unaltered. To that idealism indeed we owe the distinctive character of British Imperialism to-day. Has there been any body of men in our Empire's history from whom we have received a more glorious inheritance or a more sacred trust ?

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